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Abstract
America’s lead over Europe in manufacturing productivity from the late nineteenth cen-
tury onwards has often been contributed to diﬀerences in initial conditions, trapping
Europe in a relatively declining, labor-intensive and low-productive technological path.
In this paper, I reassess the productivity dynamics in British manufacturing on the basis
of a novel analytical framework by Basu and Weil that emphasizes the role of learning
and localized technical change and which predicts convergence in light of rapid capi-
tal deepening. By means of a data envelopment analysis, I measure the eﬀects of capital
accumulation, technological change, and eﬃciency change. I find evidence for consider-
able increased capital-intensity levels in British manufacturing during the early twenti-
eth century, particularly in the ‘new’ industries which actively began to adopt modern
techniques of mass-production and managerial control. My findings seriously challenge
the traditional, declinist, technological lock-in hypothesis. Instead, the British shift to-
ward mass-production techniques during the interwar period provides a strong case for
a remarkable escape from the labor-intensive path which had held the British manufac-
turing sector in its grasp throughout the nineteenth century.
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1 Introduction
From the late nineteenth century onwards the US forged ahead of Britain in terms of pro-
ductivity levels. Britain’s, as well as other European countries’ falling behind during the
nineteenth century and their inability to catch-up has traditionally been explained by local
circumstances; i.e. factor and resource endowments as well as demand patterns (Habakkuk
1962). In Europe natural resources were scarce, whereas skilled labor was in ample supply.
This provided European producers with an incentive to economize on fixed capital in the
form of machinery (Temin 1971, 162; Field 1985, 379). In contrast, the US was well endowed
with natural resources, while skilled labor was relatively expensive. Therefore, machinery
was substituted for skilled labor, resulting in a capital-intensive production process. Further-
more, as the American demand for goods was more homogenous, manufacturers could stan-
dardize production methods and implement high throughput systems, thereby raising pro-
ductivity levels (Broadberry 1994, 291). This advantage was denied to European producers,
who faced heterogeneous markets characterized by a demand for customized goods.1 Thus,
local circumstances determined the initial choice of technology. Technological progress was
subsequently directed toward the particular technological path a country had chosen, lead-
ing to lock-in eﬀects. Particularly David (1975, 66) puts path dependency center stage when
explaining the evolution of distinctive transatlantic systems of production. In this view, a
major shift in technology applied, for any country, is only feasible if relative factor prices
change dramatically.
As illustrated by de Jong and Woltjer (2011), the transatlantic productivity gap, which
had evolved to a ratio of around 2:1 by 1900, continued to widen up to the 1950s (see figure
1). Broadberry (1994, 292; 1997, 3) argues that this lack of productivity convergence reflected
the persistence of distinct industrial technologies in Europe and the United States. European
producers continued to pursue a crafts-based production system, losing both productivity
and technological leadership to the American system of mass-production that, up to the
1970s, proved to be technologically more progressive. In the period since the 1970s, accord-
ing to Broadberry, craft production once again became more progressive and technological
leadership reverted back to Europe. For the case of British and American industrial perfor-
mance, the premise of the coexistence of two distinct industrial systems is strengthened by
time-series evidence which finds that, after 1870, the productivity gap between both coun-
tries was non-stationary and divergent (Greasley and Oxley 1998, 184). This non-stationarity
suggests that industrial productivity followed diﬀerent, independent paths, which precludes
an important role for technology transfer.
As pointed out by Bowden and Higgins (2004, 383–4), the problem with the above in-
terpretation is that it is essentially static. “It traces the misfortunes of the interwar years
1. Note that recently Hannah (2008) has argued against the hypothesis of large heterogeneous European mar-
kets and small-scale production, illustrating his point with evidence of relatively low transportation costs and
integrated markets in Europe prior to 1914.
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Figure 1: Output per hour worked in manufacturing, US and UK (UK=100, 1890–1990)
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Source: de Jong and Woltjer (2011, 487).
to technical choices made in the previous century which depended upon specific supply-
and demand-side factors. It presumes that demand can be taken as given and that supply
adjusted accordingly, rather than allowing for the possibility that supply-side changes may
create new demands. It lacks the possibility of change, of adaption to diﬀerent conditions
and changes in resource constraints.” Basu and Weil (1998) developed an alternative analyt-
ical framework which illustrates that, regardless of static diﬀerences in factor and resource
endowments or demand patterns, countries have the potential to rapidly converge in terms
of labor-productivity levels if they successfully adopt the leaders’ production technologies.
They emphasize the fact that technological change appears to be biased toward the capital-
intensive technologies and that spillovers occur only in a limited range of technologies.
Countries operating on a technical level far below the range of the world’s technology lead-
ers are thus likely to fall behind in terms of productivity growth. This will eventually induce
them to adopt more capital-intensive production techniques in order to benefit from knowl-
edge spillovers. The mechanics behind this type of technology transfer are also regarded by
Aghion (2008, 31) and various other scholars who argue that countries distanced far away
from the productivity frontier can catch-up by applying an investment-based growth strat-
egy, provided that the necessary capabilities and resources – mainly primary and secondary
education – are available (Acemoglu 2002, 39; Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir 2006,
98). The speed at which countries are likely to converge is not only dependent upon the
size of the technology gap and the rate of capital deepening (their savings rate), but is con-
strained by the eﬀects of learning by doing and other barriers that raise the cost of adopting
a higher level of technology as well (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1997). These ideas build upon
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what Abramovitz (1986, 387) refers to as ‘social capabilities’ and Gerschenkron (1962, 113)
‘appropriate’ economic institutions to encourage technology adoption.
A number of recent studies have found empirical evidence that strongly supports Basu
and Weil’s appropriate-technology hypothesis (Kumar and Russell 2002; Los and Timmer
2005; Timmer and Los 2005; Caselli and Coleman 2006; Allen 2012). These studies rely
on a novel framework, the data envelopment analysis (DEA), that emphasizes the role of
technology and the potential for technology transfer; factors that, thus far, have received
little attention in the empirical convergence literature (Bernard and Jones 1996, 1037–8).
They confirm the importance of localized innovation – i.e. technological improvement that
is confined to a particular mix of capital and labor, or more generally, is restricted to a range
of similar technologies – and stress the finding that global technological change is decidedly
biased toward capital-intensive production techniques. This appears true both for the period
prior to and following the Second World War (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969, 574; Kumar and
Russell 2002, 529; Allen 2012, 4–5). The strong bias toward capital-intensive techniques in
conjunction with the exceptionally progressive nature of technological change during the
early twentieth century, as stressed by authors such as Gordon (1999) and Field (2003)), is
likely to have induced European entrepreneurs to increase their rate of capital deepening
and adopt American production techniques. This hypothesis is in stark contrast to the static
David model of divergent transatlantic technological paths, adhered to by Broadberry for the
twentieth century.
In this paper I adopt the DEA framework and apply it to the case of productivity and
technology convergence in Britain and the United States. The aim of this paper is threefold.
First, I want to confirm whether technological change in manufacturing during the first half
of the twentieth century was localized (i.e. whether the assumption of factor neutrality can be
rejected). The second aim is to show empirically whether British industries continued to in-
novate along their own labor-intensive productivity path (David’s model) or, if they actively
sought to adopt American techniques by accumulating physical capital, to benefit from the
rapid technological change at the capital-intensive side of the production frontier (Basu and
Weil’s model). The third and last aim of this paper is to quantify the eﬀects of technologi-
cal change, capital deepening, and barriers to technological diﬀusion on labor productivity
growth at the industry level. This will provide a novel view of the dynamics behind the
trans-Atlantic labor-productivity diﬀerentials during the early twentieth century.
For this purpose I have constructed a new set of internationally comparable, industry-
specific output, employment and capital measures, spanning the period 1899 to 1939. As
convergence in terms of labor productivity driven by technology diﬀusion typically occurs
at the level of products or industries rather than at the total economy level, I retain a highly
disaggregate level of analysis on the basis of original census data (Timmer and Los 2005,
48). This allows me to study technological change and transfer at the industry level, which
sets my study apart from previous studies that typically maintained a strong macroeconomic
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viewpoint.
In this paper my primary interest lies in the measurement of technology convergence
rather than its causes. Not because I think that a search for the causes of the patterns of ef-
ficiency is unimportant, but because I feel uncovering the pattern comes first. My findings
should be interpreted as being complementary to existing explanations in either the neoclas-
sical or endogenous-growth literature that model the impediments to technology transfer, as
well as traditional explanations of the British growth experience during the early twentieth
century. The model and the decomposition exercise is explained in section 2. In this section I
will also, briefly, discuss the construction of the data set. Section 3 presents the main results,
which are considered in light of the current debate on British technological change in section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology and data
For my study of productivity dynamics in Britain and the United States I apply a data en-
velopment analysis (DEA) and perform the decomposition technique recently proposed by
Kumar and Russell (2002). The DEA approach allows me to estimate a global production
frontier which represents the various ‘best practice’ production techniques observed for the
entire feasible range of input combinations. By tightly enveloping data points with linear
segments using mathematical programming methods, the structure of the frontier can be
revealed without imposing a specific functional form on either technology or deviations
from it (Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell 1994, 12–3). Because of its non-parametric nature, the
DEA naturally allows for any form of localized technical change, an important feature in my
framework (Los and Timmer 2005, 522). This approach also lends itself more readily to the
decomposition of productivity growth as, in contrast to traditional growth-accounting exer-
cises, it distinguishes between both the eﬀects of (global) technological change and relative
eﬃciency change. In later sections I will show that eﬃciency loss, i.e. the movement away
from the frontier, is a crucial factor in explaining the British growth dynamics during the
early twentieth century.
Data Envelopment Analysis
Figure 2 depicts a basic example of a DEA involving three producers which use two inputs
(capital K and labor L) to produce a single output (Y ). Assuming constant returns-to-scale,
I can represent the world production frontier in


k;y

space, where y is labor productivity
(Y =L) and k is capital intensity (i.e. individual production techniques, K=L).
As noted above, the frontier () for the observations in figure 2 is formed as linear com-
binations of observed extremal activities or, following the definition by Salter (1966), ‘best-
practice’ activities. An observation is said to be a best-practice activity if it exhibits full eﬃ-
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Figure 2: Illustration of data envelopment
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ciency in the Koopmans (1951, 460) sense, who defined an activity as technologically eﬃcient
if increasing any output or decreasing any input is possible only by decreasing some other
output or increasing some other input. As illustrated in appendix C, the identification of
these fully eﬃcient observations can be reduced to a basic linear programming problem in
the form of a distance function (Färe et al. 1994, 68–9).
Of the three observations in this example, only B and C are classified as best-practice
techniques. The frontier is formed by tightly enveloping these two fully eﬃcient observations
with linear segments, as illustrated in the right-hand panel of figure 2. The frontier is thus
a subset of all feasible techniques that attain the highest labor productivity for the capital
intensity levels they correspond to (Timmer and Los 2005, 52).
The panel on the right-hand side of figure 2 also shows that the last remaining obser-
vation (A) is located below the frontier. Observation A’s vertical distance to the frontier in-
dicates the potential for labor-productivity increase. Farrell (1957) shows that this distance
can be interpreted as a measure of technical eﬃciency. In figure 2, the ratio of A’s observed
productivity ya to the optimal productivity level at A’s capital-intensity y0(ka) represents the
Farrell eﬃciency index.
Decomposition
The frontier approach can be used in a decomposition of total-factor productivity (TFP), a
process described by Kumar and Russell (2002, 528–9) as ‘growth accounting with a twist’.
They break down TFP growth into two components: [1] technological catch-up, and [2] tech-
nological change. They characterize the first component asmovements toward (or away from)
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Figure 3: Illustration of growth decomposition
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the frontier, as countries adopt best practice technologies and reduce (or exacerbate) tech-
nical and allocative ineﬃciencies. The second component reflects shifts in the global pro-
duction frontier, determined conceptually by the state-of-the-art, potentially-transferable,
technology. To decompose labor productivity growth, rather than TFP growth, the eﬀects of
capital accumulation can be added, which reflect movements along the frontier (Timmer and
Los 2005, 50).
To illustrate this decomposition, I have extended the example of figure 2 to include a
second period. As shown in the left panel of figure 3, the example now includes six obser-
vations: the three original observations from period 0 and three new observations for period
1. To form the new frontier, I again utilize the distance functions to locate the fully eﬃcient
observations among the six in the sample. These observations are then enveloped by linear
segments. Both the new frontier as well as the original period 0 frontier are shown on the
right-hand side of figure 3.2
The panel on the right-hand side of figure 3 also displays two ineﬃcient observations (A
and D) which represent the same producer at time 0 and 1 respectively. Labor-productivity
change, between these observations A and D, can be decomposed according to equation (1)
below
2. Note that the period 1 frontier (1) in figure 3 consists of observations from both the first and the last period.
As a result, the frontier will only shift outward as I will discuss below.
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The first right-hand side factor measures the change in the Farrell eﬃciency index. A
value larger than 1 represents an increase in the level of technical eﬃciency over time; hence,
I denote this as the eﬃciency component. The second factor, technological change, measures the
increase in labor productivity as a result of a shift in the frontier. Since the vertical shift of
the frontier can be observed both at capital intensity ka as well as kd , I adopt a ‘Fisher ideal’
decomposition and report the geometric average of the two measures. The last factor, which
I label accumulation, is a Fisher index of the potential change in labor productivity resulting
from a shift in the capital-labor ratio. This component represents the average productivity
gains or losses as a result of the movement along both frontiers.
Extensions to the basic model
For my analysis, I have made a number of additions to the basic framework described by
Kumar and Russell. First, I adopt an ‘intertemporal’ approach, in line with the empirical
analysis of Los and Timmer (2005).3 Instead of estimating the frontier at time t based solely
on observations from this period, I also include all observations prior to period t in the pro-
duction set. Los and Timmer (2005, 522–3) argue that there are two important reasons to
adopt the intertemporal approach:
“First, because the production frontier is constructed sequentially, it can never
shift inward and hence ‘technological regress’ cannot occur. The possibility of
‘technological regress’ seems awkward and hard to defend from a knowledge per-
spective on technology, as it would involve ‘forgetting’. Second, a crucial element
in the [Basu andWeil] model is the possibility for countries to use knowledge that
was generated by technology leaders in the past. Labor-productivity levels of past
technology leaders should be attainable for latecomers.”
A potential problem is that frontier techniques observed for the first year inmy sample, 1907,
could be dominated by unobserved combinations in the past. In that case, part of what would
be interpreted as frontier movements would in fact be assimilation of knowledge associated
with these unobserved appropriate techniques. To accommodate this problem, I extended
the data set backwards by 8 years and included two additional periods for the US, 1899 and
1904 respectively.
3. For a discussion of the time component in data envelopment analysis see, Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut
(1995).
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Secondly, I address the issue of aggregation. So far, the level of aggregation in the fron-
tier analysis literature has been highly macroeconomic. Kumar and Russell (2002) for the
post-WWII period and Allen (2012) for the nineteenth and early twentieth century, for in-
stance, rely on a global production frontier for the total economy. Bernard and Jones (1996,
1043) show that sectoral measures of productivity growth and convergence can look very
diﬀerent from aggregate results. Convergence in terms of labor productivity driven by tech-
nology diﬀusion typically occurs at the level of products or industries, rather than at the total
economy level. As pointed out by Timmer and Los (2005, 48), “Convergence at the industry
level might not be reflected in macroeconomic statistics when countries diﬀer in their indus-
trial composition or experience diﬀerent patterns of structural change.” Broadberry (1997,
63–73) indeed observes substantial diﬀerences in the sectoral composition between Great
Britain and the US for the early twentieth century. Hence, I focus solely on manufacturing,
which has the biggest scope for technology spillovers. In addition, I break up the manufac-
turing sector into twenty-seven industry-groups and estimate a separate global production
frontier for each.
Data
For the analysis of transatlantic labor-productivity diﬀerentials between 1907 and 1930, I
have constructed a new data set of industry-specific real value added, employment and cap-
ital statistics. My panel observes ten benchmark years for the US (spanning the period 1899
to 1939) and two years for Great Britain (1907 and 1930). In addition, I also included two
benchmark years for Germany (1907 and 1936).4 The set thus includes data for the three
greatest industrial nations of the early twentieth century, covers approximately 105 separate
industries and overall consists of nearly 1,500 observed input-output combinations.
The capital data is based on horsepower statistics, a proxy for the stock of machinery
and equipment. I focus on machinery rather than the total capital stock for two reasons: [1]
the horsepower statistics are available at a highly disaggregate level allowing me to study
productivity at the individual industry level and [2] DeLong and Summers (1991) show that
there is a much stronger association between investment in equipment and machinery and
economic growth than any other other component of investment. Innovations are embodied
in machinery to a far greater degree than is the case for buildings and intermediate inputs.
The basic source for US industries is the Census of Manufactures, while the primary British
data is taken from the First and FourthCensus of Production. German data is drawn frommul-
tiple industrial surveys, statistical yearbooks, employment censuses as well as the archival
records of the 1936 Industrial Census. This section will briefly describe the basic methods be-
hind the construction of the data set. A full description of sources and methods can be found
in appendices A and B.
4. The results for Germany are discussed in a separate working paper; see Veenstra and Woltjer (2012).
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As a first step in the construction of my data set, I reclassified the industrial data for all
three countries and all years to the 1945 US Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).5 Gen-
erally, an industrial classification groups establishments primarily engaged in the same line,
or similar lines, of economic activities. In the case of manufacturing this is either defined
in terms of the products made (demand side) or the processes of manufacture used (sup-
ply side) (Kendrick 1961, 405–6). The SIC scheme places primary emphasis on the latter,
whereas the original, pre-war, British, German and American classifications rely heavily on
the former. The supply-side grouping of businesses – i.e. the categorization according to the
way in which inputs are transformed into outputs, mainly depending on the technology used
– fits neatly into the DEA framework.
To make the British output data directly comparable to the US, I relied on the price con-
version by Frankema, Woltjer, and Smits (2013) and de Jong and Woltjer (2011).6 The in-
dustry level conversion factors, or Purchasing Power Parities (PPP), were calculated on the
basis of producer prices using the procedures first set out by Paige and Bombach (1959) and
extensively delineated in the work of van Ark (1993, 25–52). To make the German data com-
parable to the US, I turned to two new, as yet unpublished, benchmark studies for 1907/09
and 1935/36 based on the same methodology.7 These PPPs enabled me to convert British and
German value added into nominal dollar values, both prior to and following the First World
War.
Nominal value added in dollars for all three countries was then converted to constant
prices (with a 1929 base) by applying US price deflators at the industry level. I calculated
deflators on the basis of the Fabricant (1940, 123–321, 605–39) indices of physical- and
nominal-output series. Subsequently, I reclassified these deflators to fit the SIC, and incorpo-
rated the modifications and extensions to the indices of production proposed by Kendrick
(1961, 416–21, 467–75). Lastly, I expressed the employment measure in terms of hours
worked and adjusted my capital measure to exclude the power of electric motors run by
current generated in the same establishment. The adjustment to the measure of the capacity
of horsepower was made in order to prevent the duplications of motors eﬀectively driving
the same machinery. The necessity of the hours adjustment has been stressed by de Jong
5. For an overview of the SIC, see United States Department of Commerce (1949b, 862–914).
6. Note that the interwar Anglo-American benchmark refers to the year 1935, whereas the British production
figures for this study are based on the 1930 census returns. To convert British value added to 1935 dollars I have
taken the output-price changes between 1930 and 1935 for Great Britain into account. For Britain, I extrapolated
the 1935 PPPs to a 1930 base using price deflators taken from the work of Feinstein (1972). See appendix B for
further details.
7. The price data for the German interwar benchmark was collected from the American 1935 Census of Man-
ufactures as well as the German Industrial Census of 1936. The sources and methods used were identical to those
described in the recent 1935/36 British-German benchmark by Fremdling, de Jong, and Timmer (2007) and the
1935 British-American benchmark by de Jong and Woltjer (2011). For the pre-war benchmark, US price data was
again taken from the 1909 Census of Manufactures. German, manufacturing-wide production censuses did not
become available until after the First World War. For the early benchmark, data is obtained from industrial sur-
veys, which reported output and prices for a sample of industries between 1907–1912, see Veenstra and Woltjer
(2012).
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and Woltjer (2011), who recount the substantial drop in the average hours of work for the
interwar period, particularly for the US.
My data set thus includes a single measure of output (value added in constant 1929 dol-
lars) and two inputs (hours worked and horsepower capacity), similar to the example dis-
cussed above. I also assume constant returns-to-scale throughout this paper.8 As previously
noted, I estimate a separate frontier for twenty-seven industry groups. These industry groups
are referred to as two-digit industries; a denotation which indicates their level of aggregation
as being one step above the three-digit level, the level of detail of my data set. In the estima-
tion of the frontiers I pool all the three-digit observations belonging to the same two-digit
industry, implicitly assuming that these observations share a common production function.9
3 Results
The main findings of this paper can be summarized in three points. First, for the first half
of the twentieth century technological change at the frontier was decidedly non-neutral and
biased toward capital-intensive production techniques. Because of this bias labor productiv-
ity grew fastest for capital-intensive techniques. If frontier technology was freely available to
follower countries, the latter had a clear incentive to adopt capital-intensive production tech-
niques. Secondly, in terms of capital-intensity levels, British manufacturing converged on the
US between 1907 and 1930, creating a large growth potential. Thirdly, Great Britain did not
take full advantage of the growth potential it had created. Despite the process of rapid capital
deepening, low levels of eﬃciency stood in the way of Britain catching-up in terms of labor-
productivity levels. These findings are more in line with Basu and Weil’s model of localized
technological change than David’s concept of technical lock-in.
Biased technological change
In his analysis of the diverging Anglo-American labor-productivity gap David (1975) ar-
gues that the initial choice of technology, being either capital-intensive for the US or labor-
intensive for Europe, led to distinctive rates of technical progress across the Atlantic. He
argues that, during the nineteenth century, these distinct rates of technical progress resulted
8. Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994, 32–7) show that the flexible nature of the DEA would allow me to relax
the constant-returns-to-scale assumption, this does come at a cost of greatly increased data requirements, how-
ever. A sensitivity check on the basis of variable returns-to-scale, which can be found in appendix E, demonstrates
that this assumption does not significantly alter my findings. I therefore feel confident using it.
9. Note that the two-digit classification used for the frontier estimation diﬀers moderately from the US Stan-
dard Industrial Classification. At the two-digit level the 1945 SIC only distinguishes between twenty industries.
I separated a number of these two-digit SIC industries as the assumption of a common production function
appeared to be invalid. In these cases I estimated more than one separate frontier for that respective group. A
notable example is the chemicals and allied products industry. Appendix E provides a more extensive description
of the selection of frontiers, as well as a sensitivity check on the assumption of a shared production function at
the two-digit level. Table 4 in appendix D provides an overview of the twenty-seven manufacturing industries
included in this study.
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from the fact that the eﬀect of technological advances for a particular input mix was not
automatically transferred to other technologies and was essentially ‘localized’ to a specific
capital-labor ratio. In similar vein, Basu and Weil (1998, 1027) argue that, although tech-
nology is freely available to all and instantly transferred, a country may nonetheless refrain
from using a new technology until it reaches a level of development at which this technology
would be ‘appropriate’ to its endowments. They emphasize the fact that technological change
appears to be strongly biased toward the capital-intensive technologies. Consequently, coun-
tries operating on a technical level far outside the range of the world’s technology leader are
likely to fall behind in terms of productivity growth, as they are unable to benefit from the
technological change at the capital intensive side of the production frontier. This will even-
tually induce the follower countries to adopt more capital-intensive production techniques
to take advantage of the technology improvements made by the leader countries in the past
(Timmer and Los 2005, 49–50).
Although both these models rely on the same concept of localized technological change,
David’s analysis is essentially static whereas the Basu and Weil model incorporates a dy-
namic element. The Basu and Weil model allows the possibility for countries to escape the
technological lock-in trap which inevitably follows from David’s model. As pointed out by
Bowden and Higgins (2004, 383–4), the problem with David’s interpretation is that it traces
the misfortunes of the interwar years to technical choices made in the previous century and
does not allow for the possibility of either supply- or demand-side changes. Basu and Weil
on the other hand show that, regardless of static diﬀerences in factor and resource endow-
ments or demand patterns, countries have the potential to rapidly converge in terms of labor-
productivity levels if they successfully adopt the leaders’ production technologies.
Several empirical studies have confirmed the existence of factor-biased technical change
– which stands at the heart of the Basu and Weil model – in pre-WWII manufacturing indus-
tries at the aggregate level (Salter 1966, 133; Allen 2012, 6). In this section I will corroborate
the existence of this bias for the early twentieth century at the disaggregate level, particu-
larly for those industries closely associated with the Second Industrial Revolution. The bias
in technological change, for the period between 1909 and 1939, is illustrated in figure 4 for
two of my twenty-seven industries.10 For both industries I include a plot of the global pro-
duction frontiers on the left-hand side, in line with the example in figure 3. In addition, on
the right-hand side I graph the log change in potential labor productivity as a result of the
shift in the global frontier over time. This technological change is plotted for varying levels
of capital intensity.
The top-most panels of figure 4 show that, for the industrial chemicals industries, techno-
logical progress is strongly biased toward capital-intensive forms of production. Technologi-
cal change for producers in this industry operating at a capital intensity level of 4 horsepower
per 1,000 hours of work was between 50 and 100 percent higher than for those producers op-
10. Graphs for all industries are shown in appendix D.
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Figure 4: Global technological change (1909–1939)
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erating at a capital-intensity level of 2 or less. Below a level of 0.5, technological change was
absent or negligible. The picture that emerges for this industry corroborates Basu and Weil’s
proposition that innovation is primarily carried out by the technology leader and does not
shift the production frontier as a whole. Instead, only the section of the production frontier
in the direct vicinity of the innovators’ combination of production factors shifts upward as a
result of the technological change.
The textiles industries, on the other hand, exhibited factor-neutral technological change,
as evidenced by the stable relation between capital intensity and technological change in
the lower-right panel. For textiles, the increase of labor productivity as a result of techno-
logical advances were only marginally greater at a capital-intensity level of 3 compared to
a level of 1. The discussion in appendix D shows that, for the majority of manufacturing
industries, technological change exhibited a strong bias toward capital-intensive production
techniques. Notable exceptions to this rule (i.e. textiles, leather and the foods sector) stress
the importance of a highly disaggregated analysis when studying technological change and
the diﬀusion of technology, however. I will return to this issue in the sectoral decomposition
of the Anglo-American productivity gap below.
Over time, the bias of technological change shifted further toward the right into the more
capital-intensive range of production techniques. Between 1929 and 1939 producers in the
industrial chemicals sector operating at a capital-intensity level below 2 did not experience
any further gains in labor productivity resulting from technological progress. This trend can
be observed for the majority of manufacturing industries during the early twentieth cen-
tury and continued after the war (Allen 2012, 5). Generally, I observe the most rapid rate
of technological change between 1919 and 1929, represented in figure 4 by the area of the
dotted surface. For the US, technological change contributed over 3.4 percentage points to
overall manufacturing labor-productivity growth annually between 1919 and 1929.11 This
was considerably higher than the 1.3 points experienced during the 1910s and the 1.6 points
I observe for the 1930s. The technologically progressive nature of the interwar period is also
stressed by authors such as Gordon (1999) and Field (2003). The wide range of new technolo-
gies and practices, as well as the strong capital bias in technological development created a
clear incentive for British entrepreneurs to increase the rate of capital deepening and adopt
American production techniques.
Aggregate decomposition
Table 1 reports the average annual growth rate of aggregate manufacturing productivity for
the US between 1909 and 1929 and Great Britain between 1907 and 1930. Labor-productivity
growth is broken down into the contribution of capital accumulation, technological change
11. The contribution of technological change for the sub-periods is calculated on the basis of the technological
change factor in equation (1), which represents a Fisher index of the log change in labor productivity as a result
of the shift in the global production frontier.
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Table 1:Decomposition of labor-productivity growth, total man-
ufacturing, US and GB
annual average growth rate, in ln%
accumu- tech. eﬃ-
total lation change ciency
United States (1909–1929) 3.1 0.7 2.2 0.2
Great Britain (1907–1930) 1.9 1.7 1.4 -1.2
Diﬀerence (US-GB) 1.2 -1.0 0.8 1.4
Sources: see section 2.
and eﬃciency change, following the Kumar and Russell procedure illustrated in equation
(1).12 The last row of table 1 lists the diﬀerence between the average British and American
rates of growth, essentially a decomposition of the gap in Anglo-American labor-productivity
growth into the aforementioned components.
Both American and British performance was relatively strong during this period.13
Nonetheless, labor productivity growth in the US was considerably faster, and overall the
productivity gap increased by approximately 1.2 percent per year. As table 1 illustrates,
the drivers behind the widening of the productivity gap were relatively slow technologi-
cal change and general eﬃciency decline in British manufacturing industries. However, the
process of capital deepening proceeded at a considerably higher rate in Britain, in turn de-
celerating the divergence process. Below, I will argue that the substantial accumulation com-
ponent represents a general movement of a number of modern British industries toward
American production techniques, thus partially bridging the technology gap that arose dur-
ing the nineteenth century. In the short run, the gainful impact of this capital-deepening
process on British industrial performance was weakened by a drop in eﬃciency, most likely
resulting from learning-by-doing eﬀects and other barriers that raised the cost of adopting a
higher level of technology.
Figure 5 illustrates the bridging of the transatlantic technology gap. It presents the dis-
tribution of manufacturing employment over available production techniques (proxied by
machine intensity) for both the US and Great Britain. During the first half of the twentieth
century, capital-intensity levels were converging and by 1930 Britain had already surpassed
the 1909 American level. In 1907, British manufacturing employed, on average, 0.48 horse-
12. For the total manufacturing estimates I weight technological change for all the underlying observations by
their value added shares. In this aggregation I included only the observations from the start- and end-year for
the growth decomposition.
13. Note that the annual productivity increases listed in table 1 correspond closely to the growth rates reported
by Feinstein (1976, T111–3, 129, 131) for the UK and Kendrick (1961, 465–6) for the US. British manufacturing
output rose, on average, by 1.2 percent per year between 1907 and 1930, while total employment and the average
annual hours-of-work declined by 0.1 and 0.6 percentage points respectively. American manufacturing output
grew by 4.2 percent annually between 1909 and 1929, while the number of persons engaged increased by 1.6
percent and average hours decreased by 0.9 percent during this period.
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Figure 5: Distribution of capital intensity, US and GB
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power per 1,000 hours of work in manufacturing. This ratio rose to 1.14 by 1930. In 1909,
the American capital-intensity level was 0.98, which increased to 1.81 by 1929. The upper-
right panel of figure 5 illustrates that, not only were the average levels merging, the interwar
British distribution of employment over capital-intensity levels (i.e. production techniques)
mirrored that of the US in 1909. Whereas the British distribution of production techniques
before the First World War showed a distinct pattern – with a vastly greater percentage of
workers engaged in capital-extensive industries and lacking the characteristic American tail
of very capital-intensive production – the shape and range of the distribution of production
techniques for Great Britain resembled that of the US halfway the interwar period. Prior to
the Second World War, Britain still trailed the US by almost two decades, yet overall dissim-
ilarities between production techniques used in American and British manufacturing indus-
tries disappeared to a large extent. While at the turn of the century both countries tracked
diﬀerent technical paths, such a distinction is no longer evident for the interwar period. The
comparatively high rate of capital deepening in British manufacturing implies that initial
conditions did not stand in the way of capital-intensive production.
The rapid rate of capital deepening explains nearly all of British labor-productivity
growth between 1907 and 1930, as shown in table 1. The accumulation component for Britain
is considerably larger than for its American counterpart, reflecting both a faster rise in capi-
tal intensity and the greater gains from capital deepening at lower levels of horsepower per
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hour worked; the latter aﬃrms the standard assumption of diminishing returns to capital-
intensity. The general move of British industries toward American production techniques
also led to an increase in the rate of technological change, since aggregate technological
change generally exhibits a strong bias toward capital-intensive technologies, as discussed
above. Nonetheless, the British rate of technological progress was still substantially slower
than I observe for the US during this period. Lagging technological change in Great Britain
remained a major contributor to the widening of the transatlantic productivity gap.
The final component in the Kumar and Russell decomposition, eﬃciency change, rep-
resents the residual of the observed rise in labor productivity and the potential labor-
productivity growth – the latter resulting from both capital accumulation and technology
change. Timmer and Los (2005, 52) illustrate that the eﬃciency change can be interpreted as
the result of learning-by-doing and indicates the extent to which a country has exhausted the
potential of a particular technology (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1997; Basu and Weil 1998). In
addition to these ‘pure’ eﬃciency gains or losses, the residual eﬃciency term for aggregate
manufacturing also includes the eﬀects of structural change. Table 1 reports a small eﬃ-
ciency gain for the US between 1909 and 1929, which can, for the most part, be attributed to
a favorable shift in the employment structure of American manufacturing. Over the course
of these two decades, labor was transferred from low-productive textile production toward
chemicals and machinery fabrication. Generally, pure eﬃciency, or the relative vertical dis-
tance of American industries to the world-frontiers, remained unchanged.14 British manu-
facturing experienced a similar shift in the employment structure, boosting aggregate labor-
productivity growth.15 Nonetheless, the total eﬃciency component in table 1 for Britain is
well below zero, thus suggesting a substantial decline in pure eﬃciency at the industry level.
Between 1907 and 1930, British industries were thus unable to realize their full potential
that came about through the process of rapid capital deepening and increases in technologi-
cal change. Consequently, even though British manufacturing converged on the US in terms
of capital-intensity levels, the Anglo-American productivity gap failed to narrow and, as is
evident from table 1, even widened considerably during the interwar period.
Delayed catch-up
In contrast to the literature I do not view the lack of catch-up growth as a failure on the part
of British entrepreneurs. Previous applications of the DEA-approach led to findings resem-
bling mine. For a sample of Asian countries, in the period between 1975–1992, Timmer and
Los (2005, 58, 60) find comparable gaps between potential and realized labor-productivity
14. Note that, even though the US (as technology leader) dominated the world production frontier during the
early twentieth century, I do observe several British and German observations that were located on the frontier,
thus making it a truly ‘global’ frontier.
15. In Great Britain there was a substantial outflow of labor from the textile, apparel and leather industries,
which in 1907 held a share of 43 percent of manufacturing employment but which declined to 33 percent in
1930.
17
Figure 6: Catch-up in two sequential steps
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growth.16 Timmer and Los’ interpretation of the Asian growth experience is based on Basu
and Weil’s analytical framework and rests on a two-tiered approach to catch-up. Follower
countries go through two sequential phases of development in order to close the gap to the
frontier, as depicted in figure 6.
The initial phase of catch-up, the adoption of new production techniques through the ac-
cumulation of capital, involves an extensive transformation of the production process. This
causes eﬃciency levels to deteriorate in the short run. Only after the economy has success-
fully adjusted to the new state and has ‘learned’ to operate the new technology at its full
potential, can the labor-productivity gap to the frontier be narrowed. This adjustment pro-
cess was referred to by David (1975, 1–2) as ‘learning-by-doing’. The time lag between cre-
ating potential and the movement toward the frontier depends both on the scope of capital
deepening and on the flexibility of the economy and its institutional arrangements. For the
case of Britain this implies that the implementation problems that engineers and industrial-
ists encountered in the 1920s and 1930s were not signs of failed industrialization. Instead,
they were features of modernization and inextricably linked to the initial phase of catch-up
growth.
Sectoral decomposition
Although the above discussion reveals a clear pattern in the widening of the total manu-
facturing labor-productivity gap, it masks the underlying dynamics in the British-American
16. Particularly for Korea – the country that experienced one of the fastest rates of capital deepening – the
relative distance to the global frontier increased over time. Overall, Korea grew 3.8 percentage point less than the
9.3 percent annual growth potential it had created. Instead of interpreting the negative eﬃciency component as
a failure, Timmer and Los conclude that these findings suggest a possible sequence in which countries first create
opportunities for growth by rapidly increasing capital intensities and only later start to benefit from technology
spillovers.
18
convergence process through the aggregation of industries. Table 2 captures the average an-
nual growth rate of British and American labor-productivity at the industry level.17 British
manufactures showed a comparatively strong performance in the textiles, apparel, leather,
building materials and instruments industries.18 These industries experienced relatively
slow rates of technological progress and suﬀered less eﬃciency decline, which led to a com-
paratively modest increase of the Anglo-American labor-productivity gap. In contrast, labor-
productivity levels diverged most in the industries closely associated with the Second Indus-
trial Revolution; namely, transportation equipment, chemicals, petroleum and rubber. These
‘modern’ industries experienced exceptionally rapid rates of global technical advances and
exhibited a strong bias toward uneven factor saving. During the early twentieth century, the
acceleration in the (localized) technological change induced British entrepreneurs to adopt
American-style, capital-intensive, production techniques, as evidenced by the greater accu-
mulation component for most notably the transportation-equipment industry. As observed
for aggregate manufacturing, the Anglo-American technological convergence (through the
rapid British capital deepening) led to a substantial decline in eﬃciency levels in Great
Britain for these modern industries.
A marked example of the adoption of American-style, capital-intensive production tech-
niques in Britain at the industry level is the chemicals sector. This sector encompasses the
chemicals, petroleum, coal- and rubber-products industries which, during the early twenti-
eth century, experienced an unprecedented rate of productivity growth. Between 1909 and
1929, American labor productivity in the chemicals sector grew by 4.6 percent annually, over
3 percentage points of which was derived directly from technological change. This techno-
logical change was strongly biased toward capital-intensive production techniques, as illus-
trated by the industrial-chemicals sector in figure 4. As British producers in the chemicals
sector were initially operating on a technical level outside the range of the world’s technol-
ogy leader, the contribution of technological change to British productivity growth fell well
short of that of the US, widening the Anglo-American productivity gap by 0.8 percent annu-
ally. Comparatively rapid British capital deepening in the chemicals sector more than oﬀset
the eﬀects of technological change, however. Table 2 shows that the potential for growth in
British chemicals – i.e. the sum of the technological change and accumulation components
– actually surpassed that of its American counterpart. Yet, the shift toward more capital-
intensive methods of production and the rapid technological change led to a deterioration
of eﬃciency in Great Britain, preventing British chemical producers from realizing their full
potential. Overall, the Anglo-American labor-productivity gap in this sector widened by 3.3
percent per annum. I observe similar dynamics in the other modern industries, particularly
17. The estimates in table 2 show labor productivity growth and its decomposition for the main industry groups
within manufacturing. Appendix F provides the results for the full breakdown of the manufacturing sector,
including all SIC two-digit industries.
18. Note that the instrument-producing industries are part of the miscellaneous category in table 2. See ap-
pendix F for a full breakdown of the manufacturing sector.
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Table 2: Decomposition of labor-productivity growth, manufac-
turing industries, US and GB
annual average growth rate, in ln%
accumu- tech. eﬃ-
total lation change ciency
United States (1909–1929) 3.1 0.7 2.2 0.2
Food & tobacco 3.1 1.5 1.9 -0.3
Textiles & apparel 2.3 0.5 1.9 -0.1
Paper & printing 3.6 1.1 2.4 0.2
Chemicals & rubber 4.6 0.8 3.2 0.6
Building materials 3.3 0.4 2.4 0.5
Metals 2.5 0.4 2.0 0.2
Machinery 2.2 0.1 1.5 0.6
Transportation equipment 8.2 2.0 5.6 0.6
Miscellaneous 1.9 0.3 1.8 -0.2
Great Britain (1907–1930) 1.9 1.7 1.4 -1.2
Food & tobacco 1.8 2.3 1.2 -1.7
Textiles & apparel 2.5 1.2 1.6 -0.4
Paper & printing 2.5 3.3 1.2 -2.1
Chemicals & rubber 1.3 1.9 2.3 -2.9
Building materials 2.1 1.0 1.5 -0.4
Metals 0.7 1.1 1.3 -1.7
Machinery 0.5 0.5 0.4 -0.5
Transportation equipment 3.6 3.6 3.0 -3.0
Miscellaneous 1.3 3.0 0.5 -2.1
Diﬀerence (US-GB) 1.2 -1.0 0.8 1.4
Food & tobacco 1.3 -0.8 0.7 1.5
Textiles & apparel -0.2 -0.7 0.2 0.3
Paper & printing 1.2 -2.3 1.2 2.3
Chemicals & rubber 3.3 -1.0 0.8 3.5
Building materials 1.2 -0.6 0.9 0.9
Metals 1.8 -0.7 0.7 1.9
Machinery 1.7 -0.4 1.1 1.1
Transportation equipment 4.6 -1.6 2.6 3.6
Miscellaneous 0.6 -2.6 1.3 1.9
Sources: see section 2; May not sum to total due to rounding.
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transportation equipment, but also electrical machinery, paper, printing and to a lesser de-
gree metals. Again, I distinguish stronger technological change in the US, which was biased
toward capital-intensive production techniques, coupled with considerably faster capital ac-
cumulation in Great Britain. Similarly, for these industries I also observe a severe deteriora-
tion in British eﬃciency levels.
For the textiles, apparel and building materials industries table 2 reveals a diﬀerent pat-
tern. Here, I do not observe the rapid decline in British eﬃciency levels. Moreover, for these
industries the gap in the Anglo-American labor-productivity levels rose less than the man-
ufacturing average. In the case of the textiles and apparel industries this gap even declined
slightly over the course of these two decades. As a result of relatively slow, unbiased, tech-
nological change, British producers lacked the incentive to diverge from the original, labor-
intensive technological path. This deterred them from adopting American production tech-
niques as avidly as we saw for the modern industries. The dichotomy of technology paths is
also evident in the foods sector. Even though the accumulation component for this British in-
dustry was relatively large, by 1930 the British capital intensity level in the foods sector was
still well below the American level in 1909 (0.70 versus 1.12 respectively). In the production
of food, as was the case for textiles, British industry was clearly operating on a diﬀerent part
of the technology frontier compared to their American competitors.
The traditional explanation of diﬀerences in factor endowments, which will aﬀect all
industries equally (at least in the case of the availability of labor), is unable to explain the ap-
parent divide in the rate of adoption of American, capital-intensive production techniques
across the diﬀerent manufacturing sectors. The industry-specific rate and bias of technical
progress provides a credible explanation why British entrepreneurs in the textiles and build-
ing materials, but also in the food industries, continued to track a labor-intensive path of
production, whereas, at the same time, the producers of chemicals, printing and transporta-
tion equipment diverged from this path and actively sought to adopt new, capital-intensive,
production techniques. The disaggregate decomposition above shows that only those British
industries that experienced strongly biased technological change were drawn toward these
more capital-intensive ways of production. Moreover, particularly those industries that di-
verged from their original technological path experienced a clear worsening of their relative
technical eﬃciency. As noted in the previous section, the convergence in terms of capital in-
tensity and production techniques led, in the short-run, to a widening of the Anglo-American
labor-productivity gap. Regardless, the modern industries showed strong growth potential,
the fruits of which could be reaped when the (initial) barriers to the successful adoption of
the new production techniques were overcome and producers learned to operate the new
technology at its full potential. In line with this reasoning, during the first two decades fol-
lowing the Second World War, the British manufacturing sector experienced significantly
stronger trend growth than the US and the two countries gradually started to converge in
terms of labor-productivity levels (Crafts and Mills 1996, 421).
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4 Barriers to British productivity convergence
I am certainly not the first to study Europe’s inability to close the transatlantic productiv-
ity gap during the first half of the twentieth century, and I consider the analysis applied
in this paper to be complementary to previous work discussing the constraints to British
labor-productivity growth. The non-parametric growth decomposition presented in this pa-
per uncovers the large discrepancy between created growth potential and realized growth. In
turn, the existing literature can provide a better understanding of the impediments to tech-
nological transfer and the causes behind the pronounced decline in eﬃciency within British
manufacturing. Although it is not my intent to oﬀer an exhaustive overview of the literature,
I aim to link the key mechanisms of my model to the realities of interwar Britain.
The argument made by Broadberry (1994) is that Britain failed to adapt to the changing
conditions of the interwar years and, in the face of diﬀerent endowments and demand pat-
terns, continued to pursue a crafts-based production system, losing both productivity and
technological leadership to the American system of mass-production. Consequently, Broad-
berry argues, Britishmanufactures allowed relative productivity levels to fall, under-invested
in new machinery (and hence production processes), failed to modernize its management,
under-equipped its labor force with relevant skills and embodied a myriad of restrictive
practices which prevented industry from realizing its potential (Bowden and Higgins 2004,
384). Section 3 of this paper presents a rather more dynamic view of British manufacturing.
I show that a sizable part of British manufacturing was drawn toward the more capital-
intensive, American ways of production and exhibited substantial growth potential. In this
section I will illustrate that, in these key industries, British entrepreneurs did indeed in-
troduce modern, mechanized production techniques, invested in continuous-flow manufac-
turing and adopted new techniques of managerial control. By confirming that Britain was
successfully adapting to the rapidly changing environment, I can reject the premise that the
entire manufacturing sector was locked into a separate technology path and prove that tech-
nology transfer did occur. I do argue however that, in the case of Britain, the adoption of
modern production techniques was severely hampered by government intervention in an at-
tempt to correct for market failures, the dominance of craft unions and pre-existing work
practices that proved hard to displace. These institutional impediments explain why techno-
logical diﬀusion was not as widespread, and the convergence of technological paths did not
occur as quickly as observed in the case of Germany for instance (van Ark 1993, 86–7; Crafts
and Mills 2005, 650; Crafts 2012b, 22–3).
Below, I discuss the impact of these institutions, both on the reluctance of British manu-
factures to move into the new, dynamic industries that emerged during the early twentieth
century, as well as the relatively hesitant adoption of capital-intensive production techniques
within some of these industries.
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British technological change
To illustrate the introduction of mechanized production techniques in British manufactur-
ing I once again turn to the transportation equipment industry. This industry experienced,
as I illustrated in the previous section, exceptionally rapid rates of global technical progress
which exhibited a strong bias toward uneven factor saving. I argue that these technological
advances induced British entrepreneurs to adopt American-style, capital-intensive produc-
tion techniques in order to bridge the productivity gap that had arisen during the previous
decades. The rapid capital deepening was reflected in a particularly large accumulation com-
ponent, which, between 1907 and 1930, accounted for almost all of British labor-productivity
growth in this industry. In the age of growing private motor ownership and ‘Fordism’, it was
the motor vehicles industry that particularly stood out in terms of technological progress
(Field 2011, 70). Yet it was also this industry where British engineers have been criticized
for their failure to adopt American mass-production methods (Lewchuk 1987). As argued by
Bowden and Higgins (2004, 386–7), prior to the Second World War, Britain lacked a mass-
market for automobiles as demand was limited to the middle and upper classes. The British
consumers placed a particularly high premium on the performance and quality of their mo-
tor vehicles and were less concerned with price constraints. Hence mass-production, as es-
poused by Fordism, was not a viable option for British producers.
Nonetheless, the interwar years did witness significant investment in the British motor
vehicle industry. The fact that it was not Fordist does not invalidate it. The annual growth
rate of total capital in the vehicle industry – which Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee
(1982, 241) estimate to have been 3.1 percent – was among the highest in British industry in
the interwar years. The 1920s and 1930s witnessed large investment programs undertaken by
the major motor vehicle producers with the gradual introduction of mechanized production
techniques, assembly lines and specialized machinery used to produce individual items on a
continuous basis. British producers of motor vehicles were following the path set out by the
American vehicle industry. In 1923, for example, a major investment program in continuous
flow production began at Longbridge as a result of which this site became the first motor
works in the country with a moving assembly line for the production of chassis and car
bodies (Bowden and Higgins 2004, 386–7).
These modernizations were not exclusively confined to the motor vehicle industry. Dur-
ing the First World War, in the industries essential to the war eﬀort, scientific management
techniques such as time-and-motion studies were applied in order to maximize output and
eﬃciency. Machine tools were imported from the United States and installed in the factories
where they were previously unknown. Automatic welding spread through the shipyards.
Eichengreen (2004, 320–1) notes that “the installation of automatic machinery allowed a
growing number of operations to be undertaken by workers with minimal training. In this
way, British industry took a first tentative step down the road that led to modern mass-
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production as in the United States.”
The move toward capital-intensive production techniques was not apparent in all indus-
tries, however. The textiles industry proved to be highly reluctant to invest in new production
techniques and technological change. In the previous section I showed that this industry ex-
perienced a relativelymodest rate of unbiased technological progress and that both American
and British producers were disinclined to invest in this industry. As a result, the technology
gap, that had opened up during the nineteenth century, remained wide. In accordance with
the Broadberry view, the two countries continued to track a diﬀerent technological path in
this industry. This is most obvious for cotton textiles, which was the focus of a case study
by Lazonick (1981). Lazonick argued that the cotton textile industry failed to modernize by
re-equipping with ring spinning and automatic looms. Whereas, during the interwar years,
ring spinning capacity was the dominant spinning choice in the world, the British cotton tex-
tile industry still relied heavily on mule spinning. The relative importance of rings in the UK
remained low at just around 23 percent (Bowden and Higgins 2004, 386). Consequently, by
this time a large proportion of British cotton spinning machinery had become technically ob-
solete. Sandberg (1969) argued that demand and relative factor costs were the main reasons
why English spinners persisted with mules, rather than an aversion to new technology.
The reluctance to adopt new production techniques is apparent for most traditional in-
dustries. My estimates indicate that industries such as building materials, clothing and tex-
tiles showed little or no sign of convergence in terms of capital intensity levels. Whereas
newer industries, such as chemicals, petroleum, transportation equipment, and printing did
exhibit rapid capital deepening and technological catch-up. The experience within these
industry-groups was not uniform however; the capital deepening process in the transporta-
tion equipment sector, for instance, was primarily driven by investment in the motor vehicle
and aircraft industries, while the more traditional shipbuilding and railway carriage trades
continued to track a labor-intensive production path. In the case of the engineering sector, it
was the electrical engineering industry that exhibited a high growth rate of its capital stock
and witnessed a dramatic increase in the range of items produced (Matthews, Feinstein, and
Odling-Smee 1982, 241). Even though the transformation of British manufacturing was hes-
itant and mostly limited to the more dynamic new industries there was cause for cautious
optimism. Eichengreen (2004, 341) remarked:
“By the end of the 1930s some 250 British firms had adopted modern techniques
of managerial control (including the multidivisional firm). Modern cost account-
ing had been installed, and top management was being professionalized. Spend-
ing on research and development tripled over the course of the decade. New prod-
ucts and processes proliferated, fueling hopes of the emergence of a ‘development
bloc’ of modern industries.”
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The ‘new’ industries
The role played by the new industries has been emphasized in the literature before (Richard-
son 1961; Buxton 1975; de Jong 2003, 108–9). Notably, Richardson (1962, 360–1) ties the
robust British growth performance experienced during the interwar period to these modern
industries. This view was backed by evidence of a revival of TFP growth during the 1930s, as
well as a strong emphasis on the quality of modern investment and the structuring of British
industry toward these growth-oriented sectors (Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee 1982;
Pollard 1983, 53). In addition, Richardson stresses the technical developments and the in-
troduction of new processes, production methods and products in these industries, whose
progress he considered to be largely interdependent. In the more recent historiography the
growth performance of the British economy during the 1920s and 1930s and the role played
by the new industries has been viewed more critically, however. Broadberry (1983, 466–8)
shows that structural change within manufacturing was not particularly pronounced during
this period, while overall productivity growth was not especially fast. Also, Crafts (2012b,
21) stresses the fact that productivity and TFP growth in the UK remained well below the
standard set by US industries during the first half of the twentieth century. As a result, on
an hours-worked basis, the labor-productivity gap between Britain and the US in manufac-
turing continued to widen up to the 1950s. The direct Anglo-American benchmark for 1935
by de Jong and Woltjer (2011) also reveals that particularly the modern British industries
(engineering, transportation equipment and chemicals) performed poorly in comparison to
their American counterparts.
The poor productivity performance of particularly the new industries in Britain does not
appear to favor the ‘optimistic’ interpretation by Richardson, nor does it accord well with the
wave of modernization described above. However, as previously noted, TFP growth consist of
both improvements in technology as well as eﬃciency with which the factors of productions
are used (Crafts 2012a, 7). My decomposition allows for the breakdown of TFP in both these
components. In table 3 I recast the results from section 3 in terms of ‘new industries’ and
‘old staples’, in line with the distinction made by Richardson (1965, 250) as well as Crafts
(2004, 20).19 This decomposition contrasts the strong growth potential of the new industries
against the slower, yet almost fully realized potential in the old staples.
Table 3 confirms the fact that, in British manufacturing between 1907 and 1930, hourly
labor productivity in the new industries grew slightly faster than in the old staples. In addi-
tion, it corroborates Crafts’ claim that productivity growth in the British industries remained
well below the standard set in the US and that, in international perspective, the old staples
performed comparatively better than the new industries; as the latter lost considerable less
ground to the American producers. The decomposition also reveals, however, that the poten-
tial for growth in the new British industries was substantially greater than was the case for
19. The label ’new’ refers to industries generally associated with the Second Industrial Revolution.
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Table 3: Decomposition of labor-productivity growth, new in-
dustries vs. old staples, US and GB
annual average growth rate, in ln%
accumu- tech. eﬃ-
total lation change ciency
United States (1909–1929)
New industries 3.6 0.8 2.6 0.2
Old staples 2.5 0.4 2.0 0.1
Great Britain (1907–1930)
New industries 1.8 2.5 1.7 -2.4
Old staples 1.7 1.2 1.3 -0.8
Diﬀerence (US-GB)
New industries 1.8 -1.7 1.0 2.5
Old staples 0.8 -0.8 0.7 0.9
Source: see section 2; May not sum to total due to rounding.
the old staples. Capital accumulation alone was responsible for over 2.5 percent of annual-
ized growth in the new industries, more than twice as large as the accumulation component
observed for the traditional industries. This reflects the modernization process in British
manufacturing that was, as discussed above, most pronounced in the new industries. The
contribution of capital deepening to American productivity in the new and traditional in-
dustries was substantially smaller, and the gap between the US and Great Britain arguably
demonstrates the technological convergence that took place during this period. As techno-
logical change still progressed at a considerably higher pace in the US compared to Britain,
however, it is clear that technological convergence was far from complete by 1930.20
Institutional constraints
As illustrated above, only those British firms that were part of the new industries that in the
US had benefited most from the advent of electrification, mass-production, and the introduc-
tion of professional management chose to risk the expenditure required for the successful
adoption of these modern, capital-intensive, production techniques.21 Nonetheless, even in
those British industries that chose to invest, the transformation to mass production lacked
the vigor and dynamism that characterized the US and which was also apparent in Germany
20. One must bear in mind though that the technological change listed in table 3 is a geometric average and
represents the vertical shift of the frontier both at the capital-intensity level of 1907 and 1930. In the British
new industries, technological change measured at interwar capital intensity levels was more than double that of
the period prior to the First World War (2.3 versus 1.0 percent). This large shift illustrates once more the biased
nature of technological change during this period, at least for the modern industries.
21. For a detailed discussion of the impact of electrification on productivity change see, de Jong (2003, 154–61).
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during the early twentieth century (Veenstra and Woltjer 2012). Below, I will highlight the
role of institutions in the relatively hesitant adoption of capital-intensive production tech-
niques in the more dynamic British industries.
For the motor vehicle industry, Lewchuk (1987) shows that British producers were re-
luctant to install new technologies as they wanted to limit their vulnerability to slowdowns,
something which they could aﬀord as a result of the protection imparted by tariﬀs and an
oligopoly dominated by Morris Motors. Other sectors adopted similar anti-competitive be-
havior, which was sanctioned by government policy. As Britain was rapidly losing its domi-
nant place in the world market, the interwar economy witnessed a major shift in supply-side
policy as the British government became more and more willing to intervene in the market
economy. Crafts (2004, 18) notes that, “among the innovations of this period were the begin-
nings of industrial policy in the 1920s, the general tariﬀ of 1932, the encouragement of cartels
and the imposition of controls on foreign investment in the 1930s.” The latter arrangements
allowed firms to adopt conduct which avoided competition. Consequently, modernization
and rationalization where no longer a prerequisite to survival. Instead, firms opted for a
defensive strategy and engaged in collusive behavior (Bowden and Higgins 2004, 379).
Another institutional constraint to modernization in the interwar years was the rapid ex-
pansion of the craft unions. During the war, workers had been encouraged to join unions as
a matter of public policy. Once freed from wartime restraints, the British unions became in-
creasingly assertive (Eichengreen 2004, 320–1). “Menaced by the advent of skill-displacing
technologies, which threatened to challenge their dominance of the workplace, craft unions
used their power on the shop floor to enforce traditional practices in the workplace in terms
of the numbers employed, training, routines and piece rates. Such attempts were more suc-
cessful in industries like shipbuilding and cotton spinning, where skilled craft labor could
not be easily replaced and was relatively better organized than its employers” (Magee 2004,
93). The craft unions had not yet established a solid foothold in the new industries, such as
pharmaceuticals, automobiles and electrical equipment, which consequently led managers
to face less opposition during the process of modernization. Admittedly, the high rate of un-
employment witnessed during the interwar period eroded the bargaining power of unions,
which may have enhanced the ability of firms to push for organizational and technical
change. The rise of cartelization diluted the incentive for doing so, however (Eichengreen
2004, 341).
The imposition of an elaborate tariﬀ system sheltered British manufacturing from foreign
competition, which further weakened the need to increase eﬃciency and push for organiza-
tional change. Where the tariﬀs and the encouragement of cartels may have mattered most,
however, was in retarding the transfer of resources to new uses (Eichengreen 2004, 338). As,
in the 1920s and 1930s, demand weakened for the goods from the industries in which Britain
had invested most in the nineteenth century (i.e. coal, iron and steel, textiles and shipbuild-
ing) the market economy should have begun to reallocate resources out of these uses. Instead,
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the British manufacturing sector was slow to move into the new industries. Several scholars
have interpreted this slow transformation in terms of the handicap of an early start (Svennil-
son 1954; Frankel 1955; Kindleberger 1961; Ames and Rosenberg 1963). The experience and
skills accumulated by coal miners and shipyard workers, for instance, were ill-suited to the
more technologically sophisticated new industries. In addition, the old and new industries
were often located in diﬀerent places (Eichengreen 2004, 327–8). Buttressed by tariﬀs and
cartels, British manufacturing continued to specialize in the old staples. This only stalled
the diﬃcult transition process. Productivity growth in the new industries was in fact faster
than in other branches of manufacturing, a fact that suggests that Britain’s relative overcom-
mitment to the old staples reduced the manufacturing sector’s overall rate of expansion and
slowed down the modernization process.22
The slower growth of demand in Britain did have additional consequences for the rate
of technological change as well, by aﬀecting the rate at which machinery was replaced. As
noted by Salter (1966, 64–5), gross investment was the vehicle of technological change –
since technological change was largely embodied in new capital equipment – and the rate of
investment largely determined how rapidly new techniques were brought into general use
and were eﬀective in raising productivity. Slower demand therefore accounted for the fre-
quently reported reluctance of British manufacturers to discard their old machinery at the
same rate as their American competitors (Magee 2004, 82). Salter (1966, 72–3) showed that
the best-practice plants in Britain reported similar capital intensities, applied identical pro-
duction methods and had comparable levels of productivity compared to the best plants in
the US. “The diﬀerence,” he claimed, “lies in a much higher proportion of plants employing
outmoded methods in the United Kingdom.” The disparity in the ‘standards of obsolescence’
was one of the driving forces behind the Anglo-American productivity gap during the first
half of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, the dichotomy of production techniques in British
manufacturing, as observed by Salter, emphasizes once more that British producers did not
eschew modern, capital-intensive, production techniques, but that its capital stock was sim-
ply slow to adjust to the rapid technological evolution of the time.
Another, often cited, factor that inhibited investment was the prevalence of family firms
in the British manufacturing sector (Chandler 1990). It is argued that the relatively small
British firms failed to capture economies of scale and scope inherent in new technologies.
Opportunities which German and American manufactures seized both domestically and in-
ternationally (Nicholas 2004, 243). Yet, by international standards British firms were not ex-
ceptionally small.When comparing employment data, we see that the averagemanufacturing
establishment in Britain employed 64 people, compared to 67 in the US, 14 in Germany and
26 in France. As emphasized by Magee (2004, 79–80), “The largest British chemical firm in
1903, United Alkali, employed over a thousand more workers than BASF, Germany’s biggest
manufacturer of the time. It was only in the heavy industries, such as iron and steel, that
22. See table 3, or Magee (2004, 78).
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British plants were comparatively small.”
More generally, Elbaum and Lazonick (1986, 2) claim that the institutional legacy asso-
ciated with atomistic, nineteenth century economic organization impeded the adoption of
modern technological and organizational innovations. “Entrenched institutional structures
– in industrial relations, enterprise and market organization, education, finance, interna-
tional trade, and state-enterprise relations – constrained the transformation of Britain’s pro-
ductive system.” Nonetheless, these ‘institutional rigidities’, did not prevent British firms in
the new industries from adopting modern mechanized production techniques, investing in
continuous-flow manufacturing and introducing modern techniques of managerial control.
The supply-side policies of the interwar period merely served to slow the modernization
process and retarded the transfer of resources to these new industries.
The lock-in hypothesis of British technical choice also presumes a static relation between
the cost of capital and labor. During the interwar years, these relative factor costs were
far from stable, however. Broadberry (1986, 469) shows that the average weekly hours fell
by approximately 13 percent at a time when the real wage for a ‘normal’ working week
was rising steadily. The raise in hourly labor costs was not matched by an immediate in-
crease in the hourly labor productivity, making eﬀective labor relatively more expensive in
Britain (Eichengreen 2004, 324). At the same time, technical progress itself exerted continu-
ous downward pressure on the cost of capital goods (Salter 1966, 35–6). The cheapening of
capital goods relative to wages gave further impetus to the modernization and rationalization
movement in British manufacturing, particularly in those industries where capital could be
easily substituted for skilled labor.
British growth after the Second World War
Crafts (2012b, 22) shows that, during the period 1950 to 1973, “Britain experienced its
fastest-ever economic growth but at the same time relative economic decline proceeded at
a rapid rate vis-a-vis its European peer group such that by the end of the period Britain had
been overtaken by [...] nine other [countries] in terms of labour productivity.” Following the
Second World War, the interwar policies that reduced competitive pressures on British busi-
ness change proved hard to displace and turned out to have long-lasting eﬀects on output
growth and productivity convergence. Even though a sizable portion of British manufactur-
ing had successfully taken the first step in the Basu and Weil model and had created consid-
erable potential for growth during the 1920s and 1930s, the implementation of the crucial
second stage, ’learning-by-doing’, proved to be more problematic. The process of learning-
by-doing was, in the case of Britain, decelerated by an inflexible labor market and strong
unions, as well as the cartelization and collusive practices previously described. As noted
by Eichengreen (2004, 338), the industries that had implemented capital-intensive produc-
tion techniques felt reduced pressure to optimize their eﬃciency levels, as tariﬀs and cartels
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created a “cozy environment sheltered from the chill winds of competition.” Furthermore,
British commitment to education and human capital formation lagged behind its major in-
ternational rivals (Goldin and Katz 2008). Traditionally, Britain provided less basic education
to its general labor force and directed educational reform toward clerical skills. This left the
country relatively poorly placed to take full advantage of the new technologies introduced in
the early twentieth century. “This was a legacy that was to cause twentieth-century diﬃcul-
ties,” as emphasized by Harley (2004, 175), “it was an eﬃcient response to Britain’s position
as the first industrialized country, perhaps, but a restraint on future growth.” As a result,
Britain was less successful than other European nations in exploiting the opportunities for
catch-up growth, gradually losing ground against her European rivals (Bean and Crafts 1996,
133). Nonetheless, as illustrated by Crafts and Mills (1996, 421), labor-productivity growth
between 1951 and 1973 was considerably faster in the UK than in the US, resulting in the
gradual decline of the Anglo-American productivity gap. The post-war productivity conver-
gence supports the premise of a two-tiered process of catch-up growth that, for Great Britain,
had its origins in the interwar era.
5 Conclusion
As noted by Tomlinson (2009, 228), the economic history literature on early-twentieth cen-
tury British manufacturing has taken a rather despondent, or ‘declinist’, view. “Every indus-
try or even company’s failure to match performance in another country has been commonly
treated not as part of the rough and tumble life of global capitalism, or even as the result
of contingent error and miscalculation, but rather as a symptom of profound economic, but
also political, social and cultural malaise.” In part, Broadberry’s thesis that the divergence of
Anglo-American labor productivity reflected the persistence of distinct industrial technolo-
gies in Europe and the United States, follows this tradition. He argues that, in the face of
diﬀerent endowments and demand patterns British producers continued to pursue a crafts-
based production system, inevitably losing both productivity and technological leadership
to the American system of mass-production.
This paper presents a rather more positive view of interwar British manufacturing, as I
reassess the productivity dynamics on the basis of Basu andWeil’s model of appropriate tech-
nology, which predicts convergence in light of capital deepening. I show that a substantial
part of British manufacturing, particularly the ‘new’ industries of the Second Industrial Rev-
olution, was drawn toward the American mechanized production techniques and exhibited
substantial growth potential. These new industries – i.e. chemicals, transportation equip-
ment, electrical engineering and printing – exhibited strong rates of technological progress
that was decidedly biased. Because of this bias in technological progress, labor productivity
grew fastest for capital-intensive techniques during the first half of the twentieth century,
which prompted British manufactures to rapidly increase their rate of capital deepening.
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These findings are confirmed by examples of the introduction of modern mechanized pro-
duction techniques, investment in continuous-flow manufacturing and the adoption of new
techniques of managerial control. By confirming that parts of British manufacturing was
successfully adapting to the rapidly changing environment, I can reject the premise that the
entire manufacturing sector was locked-in a separate technology path, as argued by Broad-
berry.
However, in spite of these clear examples of British mechanization, the modernization
process was severely hampered by government intervention in an attempt to correct market
failures, the dominance of craft unions and pre-existing production practices. Supply-side
policies of the interwar period slowed the modernization process and retarded the transfer
of resources to new industries. The reluctance to adopt modern production techniques is
particularly apparent for the traditional industries. My figures indicate that the old staples
such as building materials, clothing, and textiles showed little signs of convergence in terms
of capital intensity levels. Consequently, in contrast to Broadberry, in my estimates I do not
observe a single development path for all manufacturing industries, but instead I find large
heterogeneity in the modernization process within British manufacturing.
Even though British manufacturing converged on the US in terms of capital-intensity
levels, the Anglo-American productivity gap failed to narrow and even widened during the
interwar period. I show that, particularly for the modern industries, the capital-deepening
process was accompanied by a large productivity growth potential which, however, did not
materialize as low levels of technical eﬃciency stood in the way of convergence. Following
Basu and Weil’s appropriate-technology model, I interpret the decrease of relative eﬃciency
as a feature of modernization inextricably linked to the first phase of catch-up growth, i.e.
creating potential. Only after an economy has adjusted to the new situation and has ex-
hausted the full potential of the new technology the labor-productivity gap to the frontier
can be narrowed. In the case of postwar Britain this process of learning-by-doing was deceler-
ated by an inflexible labor market and strong unions, as well as cartelization and widespread
collusive practices. This ‘institutional legacy’ caused Britain to be less successful than other
European nations in exploiting the opportunities for catch-up growth following the Second
World War, thus causing her to gradually lose ground against her major European rivals.
Nonetheless, the UK experienced significantly stronger trend growth than the US between
1951 and 1973 and the two economies converged in terms of labor-productivity levels.
31
References
Abramovitz, M. 1986. “Catching-up, Forging Ahead and Falling Behind.” Journal of Economic History
46:385–406.
Acemoglu, D. 2002. “Directed Technical Change.” Review of Economic Studies 69:781–809.
Aghion, P. 2008. “Higher Education and Innovation.” Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik Vol. 9:28–45.
Allen, R. 2012. “Technology and the Great Divergence: Global Economic Development Since 1820.”
Explorations in Economic History 49:1–16.
Ames, E., and N. Rosenberg. 1963. “Changing Technological Leadership and Industrial Growth.” Eco-
nomic Journal 73:13–31.
van Ark, B. 1993. International Comparisons of Output and Productivity: Manufacturing Productivity
Performance of Ten Countries from 1950 to 1990.Groningen: Groningen Growth and Development
Centre.
Atkinson, A., and J. Stiglitz. 1969. “A New View of Technological Change.” Economic Journal 79:573–
578.
Barro, R., and X. Sala-I-Martin. 1997. “Technological Diﬀusion, Convergence, and Growth.” Journal of
Economic Growth 2:1–27.
Basu, S., and D. Weil. 1998. “Appropriate Technology and Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
113:1025–1054.
Bean, C., and N. Crafts. 1996. “British Economic Growth Since 1945: Relative Economic Decline and
Renaissance?” Chap. 6 in Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945, edited by N. Crafts and G.
Toniolo, 131–172. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bernard, A., and C. Jones. 1996. “Technology and Convergence.” Economic Journal 106:1037–1044.
Bowden, S., and D. Higgins. 2004. “British Industry in the Interwar Years.” In Floud and Johnson
2004, chap. 14.
Broadberry, S. 1983. “Unemployment in Interwar Britain: A Disequilibrium Approach.” Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers 35:463–485.
. 1986. “Aggregate Supply in Interwar Britain.” Economic Journal 96:467–481.
. 1994. “Technological Leadership and Productivity Leadership in Manufacturing Since the
Industrial Revolution: Implications for the Convergence Debate.” Economic Journal 104:291–302.
. 1997. The Productivity Race: British Manufacturing in International Perspective, 1850–1990.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buxton, N. 1975. “The Role of the ‘New’ Industries in Britain During the 1930s: A Reinterpretation.”
Business History Review 2:205–222.
Carter, S., S. Gartner, M. Haines, A. Olmstead, R. Sutch, and G. Wright, eds. 2006. Historical Statistics
of the United States: Millennial Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
32
Caselli, F., and W. Coleman. 2006. “The World Technology Frontier.” American Economic Review
96:499–522.
Chandler, A. 1990. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Harvard: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press.
Crafts, N. 2004. “Long-run Growth.” In Floud and Johnson 2004, chap. 1.
. 2012a. “Creating Competitive Advantage: Policy Lessons from History.” Chap. 2 in The UK
in a Global World: How Can the UK Focus on Steps in Global Value Chains That Really Add Value?,
edited by D. Greenaway, 7–35. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
. 2012b. “British Relative Economic Decline Revisited: The Role of Competition.” Explorations
in Economic History 49:17–29.
Crafts, N., and T. Mills. 1996. “Europe’s Golden Age: An Econometric Investigation of Changing Trend
Rates of Growth.” Chap. 11 inQuantitative Aspects of Post-War European Economic Growth, edited
by B. van Ark and N. Crafts, 415–431. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
. 2005. “TFP Growth in British and German Manufacturing, 1950–1996.” Economic Journal
115:649–70.
David, P. 1975. Technical Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth. Essays on American and British Ex-
perience in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DeLong, B., and R. Summers. 1991. “Equipment Investment and Economic Growth.”Quarterly Journal
of Economics 106:445–502.
Eichengreen, B. 2004. “The British Economy Between theWars.” In Floud and Johnson 2004, chap. 12.
Elbaum, B., and W. Lazonick. 1986. The Decline of the British Economy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fabricant, S. 1940. The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899–1937. New York: National Bureau
Economic Analysis.
. 1942. Employment in Manufacturing, 1899–1939. New York: National Bureau Economic Anal-
ysis.
Färe, R., S. Grosskopf, and K. Lovell. 1994. Production Frontiers. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Färe, R., S. Grosskopf, M. Norris, and Z. Zhang. 1994. “Productivity Growth, Technical Progress, and
Eﬃciency Change in Industrialized Countries.” American Economic Review 84:66–83.
Farrell, M. 1957. “The Measurement of Productivity Eﬃciency.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society
120:253–290.
Feinstein, C. 1972. National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom, 1855–1965. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
. 1976. Statistical Tables of National Income, Expenditure and Output of the UK, 1855–1965. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
33
Field, A. 1985. “On the Unimportance of Machinery.” Explorations in Economic History Vol. 22:378–
401.
. 2003. “The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century.” American Economic
Review 93:1399–1413.
. 2011. A Great Leap Forward: 1930s depression and U.S. economic growth. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press.
Floud, R., and P. Johnson, eds. 2004. The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain. Vol. 2. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankel, M. 1955. “Obsolescence and Technological Change in a Maturing Economy.” American Eco-
nomic Review 45:296–319.
Frankema, E., P. Woltjer, and J. Smits. 2013. “Changing Economic Leadership: A New Benchmark of
Sector Productivity in the United States and Western Europe, ca. 1910.” Tijdschrift voor Sociale en
Economische Geschiedenis 10:80–113.
Fremdling, R., H. de Jong, and M. Timmer. 2007. “British and German Manufacturing Productivity
Compared: A New Benchmark for 1935/36 Based on Double Deflated Value Added.” Journal of
Economic History 67:350–378.
Gerschenkron, A. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays. Cambridge:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Goldin, C., and L. Katz. 2008. The Race Between Education and Technology. Cambridge: Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press.
Gordon, R. 1999. “US Economic Growth Since 1870: One Big Wave?” American Economic Review
89:123–128.
Greasley, D., and L. Oxley. 1998. “Comparing British and American Economic and Industrial Perfor-
mance 1860–1993: A Time Series Perspective.” Explorations in Economic History 35:171–195.
Habakkuk, J. 1962. American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century. The Search for Labour-
saving Inventions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hannah, L. 2008. “Logistics, Market Size, and Giant Plants in the Early Twentieth Century: A Global
View.” Journal of Economic History 68:46–79.
Harley, K. 2004. “Trade, 1870–1939: From Globalization to Fragmentation.” In Floud and Johnson
2004, chap. 7.
Huberman, M., and C. Minns. 2007. “The Times They are not Changin’: Days and Hours of Work in
Old and New Worlds, 1870–2000.” Explorations in Economic History 44:538–567.
Inklaar, R., H. de Jong, and R. Gouma. 2011. “Did Technology Shocks Drive the Great Depression?
Explaining Cyclical Productivity Movements in U.S. Manufacturing, 1919–1939.” Journal of Eco-
nomic History 71:827–858.
34
Jones, E. 1963. “New Estimates of Hours of Work per Week and Hourly Earnings, 1900–1957.” Review
of Economics and Statistics 45:374–385.
de Jong, H. 2003. Catching Up Twice: The Nature of Dutch Industrial Growth During the Twentieth Cen-
tury in a Comparative Perspective. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
de Jong, H., and P. Woltjer. 2011. “Depression Dynamics: A New Estimate of the Anglo-American
Manufacturing Productivity Gap in the Interwar Period.” Economic History Review 64:472–492.
Kendrick, J. 1961. Productivity Trends in the United States. Princeton: National Bureau Economic Re-
search.
Kindleberger, C. 1961. “Obsolescence and Technical Change.” Bulleting of the Oxford University Insti-
tute of Economics and Statistics 23:281–297.
Koopmans, T. 1951. “Eﬃcient Allocation of Resources.” Econometrica 19:455–465.
Kumar, S., and R. Russell. 2002. “Technological Change, Technological Catch-up, and Capital Deep-
ening: Relative Contributions to Growth and Convergence.” American Economic Review 92:527–
548.
Lazonick, W. 1981. “Production Relations, Labor Productivity, and Choice of Technique: British and
U.S. cotton spinning.” Journal of Economic History 41:491–516.
Lewchuk, W. 1987. American Technology and the British Vehicle Industry. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Los, B., and M. Timmer. 2005. “The ’Appropriate Technology’ Explanation of Productivity Growth
Diﬀerentials: An Empirical Approach.” Journal of Development Economics 77:517–531.
Magee, G. 2004. “Manufacturing and Technological Change.” In Floud and Johnson 2004, chap. 4.
Matthews, R., C. Feinstein, and J. Odling-Smee. 1982. British Economic Growth, 1856–1973. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Nicholas, T. 2004. “Enterprise and Management.” In Floud and Johnson 2004, chap. 9.
Paige, D., and G. Bombach. 1959. A Comparison of National Output and Productivity of the United King-
dom and the United States. Paris: Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.
Pollard, S. 1983. The Development of the British Economy. 3rd ed. Baltimore: Edward Arnold.
Richardson, H. 1961. “The New Industries Between the Wars.” Oxford Economic Papers 13:360–384.
. 1962. “The Basis of Economic Recovery in the Nineteen-Thirties: A Review and a New Inter-
pretation.” Economic History Review 15:344–363.
. 1965. “Over-Commitment in Britain Before 1930.” Oxford Economic Papers 17:237–262.
Rostas, L. 1948. Productivity, Prices and Distribution in Selected British Industries. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Salter, W. 1966. Productivity and Technical Change. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
35
Sandberg, L. 1969. “American Rings and English Mules: The Role of Economic Rationality.”Quarterly
Journal of Economics 83:25–43.
Svennilson, I. 1954. Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy. Geneva: United Nations.
Temin, P. 1971. “Labour Scarcity in America.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History Vol. 1:251–264.
Timmer, M., and B. Los. 2005. “Localized Innovation and Productivity Growth in Asia: An Intertem-
poral DEA Approach.” Journal of Productivity Analysis 23:47–64.
Tomlinson, J. 2009. “Thrice Denied: ‘Declinism’ as a Recurrent Theme in British History of the Long
Twentieth Century.” Twentieth Century British History 20:227–251.
Tulkens, H., and P. Vanden Eeckaut. 1995. “Non-parametric Eﬃciency, Progress and Regress Measures
for Panel Data: Methodological Aspects.” European Journal of Operational Research 80:474–499.
Vandenbussche, J., P. Aghion, and C. Meghir. 2006. “Growth, Distance to the Frontier and Composi-
tion of Human Capital.” Journal of Economic Growth 11:97–127.
Veenstra, J., and P. Woltjer. 2012. “The Yanks of Europe? Technological Change and Labor Produc-
tivity in German Manufacturing, 1909–1936.” In XVIth World Economic History Congress, 1–29.
Stellenbosch.
36
Oﬃcial publications
Board of Trade. 1912. Final Report on the First Census of Production of the United Kingdom (1907).
London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce.
. 1933–5. Final Report on the Fourth Census of Production of the United Kingdom (1930). London:
H.M. Stationery Oﬃce.
. 1938–44. Final Report on the Fifth Census of Production and the Import Duties Act Inquiry (1935).
London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce.
Great Britain Department of Employment and Productivity. 1971. British Labour Statistics: Historical
Abstract 1886–1968. London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce.
International Labour Oﬃce. 1939. Year Book of Labour Statistics 1939. Geneva.
United States Department of Commerce. 1913. “Manufactures.” In Thirteenth Census of the United
States Taken in the Year 1910, vol. VIII. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing
Oﬃce.
. 1917.Abstract of the Census of Manufactures 1914.Washington D.C.: United States Government
Printing Oﬃce.
. 1923. “Manufactures.” In Fourteenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1920, vol. VIII.
Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Oﬃce.
. 1933. “Manufactures: General Report.” In Fifteenth Decennial Census of the United States.Wash-
ington D.C.: United States Government Printing Oﬃce.
. 1942. “Manufactures: Statistics by Subjects.” In Sixteenth Decennial Census of the United States.
Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Oﬃce.
. 1949a. Census of Manufactures 1947. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing
Oﬃce.
. 1949b. “Statistics by Industry.” In United States Department of Commerce 1949a.
. 1952. “Indexes of Production.” In United States Department of Commerce 1949a.
37
A Note on American data
The basic source of output, employment and capital data for US industries is the Census
of Manufactures. Data on total employment, value added and total horsepower employed is
available in the quinquennial censuses between 1899 and 1919 and the biennial censuses of
1923 to 1929 and 1939 (United States Department of Commerce 1913, 1923, 1933, 1942).
In this appendix I will define the basic variables, discuss the comparability of the figures
between diﬀerent census years and clarify the industry classification.
Basic sources
Nominal value added is derived directly from the census figures as the net of the ex-factory
value of products (the selling value at the factory or plants) minus the cost of materials,
purchased fuel and electric energy and contract work. No attempt was made to adjust for
inventory revaluations or fully account for maintenance work and repairs, but evidence pre-
sented by Fabricant (1940, 340–50) suggests that these adjustments would only marginally
aﬀect gross value added for the years in my sample. I calculated deflators at the industry level
on the basis of the Fabricant (1940, 123–321, 605–39) indices of physical output and nominal
output series.23 Subsequently, I incorporated the modifications and extensions to the indices
of production proposed by Kendrick (1961, 416–21, 467–75). Lastly, I reclassified these de-
flators to fit the 1945 Standard Industry Classification (SIC), which constitutes the basis for
both the Kendrick series and my own.24 Throughout, nominal value added was converted to
constant prices (with a 1929 base) by applying the price deflators at the two-digit SIC level.
I define employment as the sum of wage earners, salaried oﬃcers and employees.25 I
exclude all proprietors and firm members as I wish to limit my analysis to manufacturing
personnel whose activity directly contributes to the value added reported in the census. In
censuses prior to 1935, manufactures were instructed to report all personnel employed in
both production activities and in auxiliary activities such as maintenance, shipping, ware-
housing, etc. at the same location. My employment figures thus invariably include a num-
ber of employees engaged in these kinds of non-manufacturing activities. This distinction is
complicated further by the 1939 schedule that asked employers to report separate figures for
their manufacturing and non-manufacturing personnel, based either on- or oﬀ-site. Although
it is diﬃcult to establish to what extent this change in definition aﬀects the comparability of
the employment figures between the censuses, Fabricant (1942, 173) concludes that “the im-
plicit census definition of factory employment has given rise to no serious ambiguities in
the data.” For 1939 I included all non-manufacturing personnel in my employment totals
23. Note, 1939 physical output was derived from United States Department of Commerce (1952, 1).
24. For the computation of the aggregate price indices I maintained theMarshall-Edgeworth formula with 1909,
1919 and 1929 as base-years.
25. The category ’salaried oﬃcers and employees’ includes all superintendents, managers and clerical workers.
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while still excluding proprietors and firm members, which is compatible with the definition
applied by Kendrick (1961, 434) for this year.
The census employment figures were converted to total hours worked on the basis of
industry-specific average annual hours of work obtained from various sources. For the inter-
war period I relied on data by Inklaar, Jong, and Gouma (2011, 852–4), who provide detailed
estimates of average hours of work for wage earners.26 I extended their dataset to include the
census years prior to World War I. The censuses of 1909 and 1914 provide industry specific
data on prevailing hours of labor per week; no data is available for the years 1899 and 1904,
I used the 1909 average hours instead (United States Department of Commerce 1913, 316–9;
1917, 482–9). I normalized the industry-specific weekly hours over the total manufacturing
figures provided by Jones (1963, 375), using census wage earners as weights. Lastly, I con-
verted the prewar estimates to annual average hours worked, based on the 1900 estimate of
American vacation and holidays by Huberman and Minns (2007, 546).
Capital intensity is defined as the sum of the horsepower capacity of prime movers and
the horsepower rating of motors driven by purchased electric energy, divided by mymeasure
of employment. This definition coincides with the census measure of primary power, which
also excludes the power of electric motors run by current generated in the same establish-
ment to prevent duplication. The census years 1921 and 1931 to 1937 were entirely excluded
frommy sample as data on power equipment was either not collected or incomplete for these
years. Although it is likely that rates of capacity utilization have changed during my period
of study, partly as a result of the shift from the use of prime movers toward electric motors,
I was unable to adjust for these.
Scope and comparability
During the 1899–1939 period the scope of the activities covered by the census has changed
somewhat. Prior to 1919, the American industrial census exempted all establishments with
an annual production valued at less than $500; for the years since 1919 this limit was raised
to $5,000. In the 1921 census report this resulted in a 21.6 percent reduction in the number
of establishments covered. However, the comparability of the figures since 1919 were not
appreciably aﬀected as, according to the United States Department of Commerce (1942, 2),
“99.4 percent of the total wage earners and 99.7 of the total value of products reported at
that census [1919, red.] were contributed by the establishments reporting products to the
value of $5,000 or more.” In addition, from 1904 onwards, the Census of Manufactures was
confined to establishments conducting work under the factory system, thus excluding neigh-
borhood industries and hand trades. For 1899 I relied on reclassified figures provided in the
1909 census. The adjusted figures omit all non-factory establishments for 1899 and are thus
26. These figures relate exclusively to wage earners, however this group comprises the bulk of my employment
measure, and any deviations in hours worked between wage earners and salaried oﬃcers and employees are
bound to be small compared to the annual fluctuations observed during this period.
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fully comparable to the statistics for subsequent census years (United States Department of
Commerce 1913, 507–17).
Over the course of my period of study several major industries, engaged in activities no
longer considered as manufacturing, were excluded from the census.27 I followed this con-
vention and withdrew these industries frommy sample. Over the various censuses numerous
changes were made to the classification of industries and products, inevitably resulting in
discontinuities and breaks in the series. Fabricant (1940, 605–39; 1942, 179–230) discusses
the continuity of the census value added and employment data over the period 1899 to 1939
at length. Overall, predominantly smaller industries were aﬀected by the changes across the
various census years, thus limiting the overall impact on the coherence of the data set. Where
necessary, I have combined related industries into aggregate groupings to ensure continu-
ity.28
Standard industrial classification
In my analysis I rely on the industrial classification laid out in the 1947 Census of Manu-
factures (United States Department of Commerce 1949b, 862–914). The census classification
was derived from the 1945 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), which was the first attempt
to standardize the collection and reporting of data across diﬀerent agencies while maintain-
ing consistency over a longer time-frame.29 The industrial classification groups establish-
ments primarily engaged in the same line or similar lines of economic activity which, in the
case of manufacturing, is generally defined in terms of the products made (demand side) or
the processes of manufacture used (supply side) (Kendrick 1961, 405–6). The SIC scheme
places primary emphasis on the latter, whereas the original, prewar, census classifications
relies heavily on the former.30 The supply-side grouping of businesses – i.e. the categoriza-
tion according to the way in which inputs are transformed into outputs, mainly depending
on the technology used – fits neatly into my productivity study. Although the SIC has under-
gone several revisions (the latest in 1987), I explicitly chose to use the 1945 vintage as the
introduction of new products and production techniques over time make the more recent
classifications less applicable to the period preceding the Second World War.
27. Important industries that were dropped are motion picture production, manufactured gas, automobile re-
pairing, and railroad repair shops; see e.g. Kendrick (1961, 404).
28. E.g. Cigarettes (211) and Cigars (212) were combined into an aggregate industry group as well as Flat Glass
(321) and Pressed and Blown Glassware (322).
29. The diﬀerences between the 1947 census and the 1945 SIC are minor; for a detailed discussion see United
States Department of Commerce (1949b, 931–3).
30. Although in many respects the SIC resembles the prewar census classifications, there have been a number of
important changes that highlight the shift from a demand-side to a supply-side oriented classification. Notably in
metals, the prewar censuses grouped establishments according to whether they produced ferrous or nonferrous
products. The 1945 SIC reclassified these industry groups according to whether the production process was
mainly associated with primary production (e.g. refining, smelting, rolling, etc.) or the production of finished
metal products (e.g. nails, wire, hardware, etc.), regardless of the type of metal from which the end-product
consisted.
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Following the standard industrial classification, the manufacturing division comprises
approximately 450 industries in 1939, which are included in 127 industry groups and 20
major groups. These major groups are commonly referred to as two-digit industries and are
broken down into three-digit industries (i.e. industry groups), which in turn are separated
into four-digit industries (Carter et al. 2006, 4:4). I restrict my analysis to the three-digit level,
moderately modified to ensure continuity, leaving me with 105 observations for each of the
10 census years. I generally estimate a frontier at the two-digit level, implicitly assuming that
industries share a production function at this level of aggregation. As previously noted, the
SIC groups industries according to a similarity in their inputs, outputs or use of production
techniques, giving credence to the assumption of a joint production function. For a number
of two-digit industries this assumption was violated, in which case I estimate two or more
frontiers for that respective group.31
31. The most notable example is chemicals and allied products (28) for which five separate technology frontiers
were estimated. See table 4 for further details.
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B Note on British data
The primary British data is taken from the First and Fourth Census of Production (Board of
Trade 1912, 1933–5). In this appendix I will provide an in-depth discussion of the basic vari-
ables and methods of construction behind this data set. I explore the amendments required
for changes in geographical coverage and discuss the exclusion of small firms. In addition, I
analyze the comparability of the British and American data and review the steps required to
make them analogous.
Basic sources
As was the case for the US, British output, labor and capital data is derived from the oﬃ-
cial production censuses. I selected the years 1907 and 1930, as both these surveys contain
detailed information on gross output, intermediate inputs, employment and installed horse-
power. Even though the terminology in the British and American censuses diﬀer slightly,
the concepts of value added, employment and horsepower capacity are equivalent for both
countries. Gross output is again defined as the ex-factory value of products, whereas inter-
mediate input represents the cost of materials, fuel and contract work. Value added, or net
output, is the net of gross output and intermediate input and constitutes the sum of wages,
salaries, rent, royalties, rates and taxes, depreciation of plant and machinery, advertisement
and selling expenses and all other similar charges as well as profits.
As a first step in the construction of my data set, I reclassified the British industrial clas-
sification to fit the 1945 US Standard Industrial Classification (see appendix A). As was the
case for the American data, I restrict the classification to the three-digit level. The level of
detail in the British classification necessitated a number of modifications to the level of ag-
gregation in order to maintain comparability and continuity over time.32 The resulting data
set consists of 64 observations for both 1907 and 1930 and cover the British factory trades in
their entirety.
Subsequently, I converted British output to nominal dollar values on the basis of the
price conversion factors in Frankema, Woltjer, and Smits (2013) and de Jong and Woltjer
(2011). In both these industry-of-origin studies the industry level conversion factors were
calculated on the basis of producer prices, using the procedures first set out by Paige and
Bombach (1959) and clearly exposited in the work of van Ark (1993). Note that the interwar
PPPs rely on price data taken the Fifth Census of Production, which refers to the year 1935
(Board of Trade 1938–44). I extrapolated the interwar conversion factors to a 1930 base using
price deflators taken from the work of Feinstein (1976, 61–9). The nominal dollar values
were then converted to constant prices (with a 1929 base) by applying the American price
deflators, discussed in appendix A above. Both the Anglo-American PPPs and the American
32. Particularly the British engineering trades lacked the detail specified in the US SIC. In this case I opted for
the lowest feasible aggregation level based on the detail provided in the census.
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price deflators were implemented at the two-digit SIC level.
For Britain I define employment as the sum of operatives (wage earners) and administra-
tive, technical and clerical staﬀ. In line with the definition used for the US, I include only
those personnel whose activity directly contributes to the firm’s production (thus excluding
owners and firm members). I converted the 1907 employment figures to annual hours of
work on the basis of Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982, 566) estimate of the aver-
age number of weeks worked per year as well as weekly hours of work listed in the British
Labour Statistics (Great Britain Department of Employment and Productivity 1971, 95).33
For the interwar period I again rely on Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982, 566),
but base my estimate of the average length of the working week on a study by the Interna-
tional Labour Oﬃce (1939, 82–3).
For the British capital-intensity data I utilize the American formula of adding up horse-
power of prime movers and of electric motors using purchased electricity. The 1930 census
directly reports both the power available from prime movers and the horsepower of electric
motors driven by purchased electricity. Unfortunately, no data is available for the horsepower
capacity of electric motors in 1907 and I rely on figures of electricity purchased to estimate
the horsepower of electric motors.34 The prewar census does provide detailed figures on the
total capacity of (non-electric) prime movers, however.
Scope and comparability
The 1930 census deals exclusively with industrial production in England, Wales and Scot-
land, whereas the 1907 Census of Production relates to United Kingdom as a whole. For-
tunately, the 1907 census does provide separate figures for England and Wales, Scotland
and Ireland.35 To make the prewar census directly comparable to the interwar census, I ex-
cluded Ireland from the 1907 sample and rely exclusively on the production figures for Great
Britain. This adjustment does not materially aﬀect the productivity estimates, however, as
only a fraction of industrial production in the United Kingdom took place in Ireland at this
time.36
33. Note that the figures for the average length of the working week are industry specific and refer to the year
1906.
34. Although my estimate of electric motors driven by purchased energy is fairly rough, its possible impact
on the British capital intensity figures is limited as electric motors were still fairly uncommon at this time.
Comparable figures for the US and Germany reveal that, prior to the First World War, less than 20 percent of the
installed horsepower consisted of electric motors, while only a fraction of these were run by purchased electricity.
35. In some cases the Board of Trade chose to aggregate the production figures to prevent the disclosure of
particulars relating to specific firms. The latter measure is taken primarily for small Irish firms that have no, or
only a few, direct competitors within the confines of the country. Consequently, although my data for 1907 does,
invariably, include some residual production figures for Ireland, the overall impact is limited on account of the
small size of the firms in question.
36. The production in Ireland focused mainly on the textiles and food sectors and, overall, accounted for just
3.2 percent of net output and 4.2 percent of employment in the manufacturing sector of the United Kingdom
(Board of Trade 1912, 18–9).
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Comparability between both census years is aﬀected by the exemption of small firms
from the interwar schedule. At the 1930 census, firms employing ten persons or less were
exempted from making detailed returns. Full returns were required from all businesses, ir-
respective of their size, at the 1907 census. Although the extent of the bias is diﬃcult to de-
termine, evidence presented by Rostas (1948, 25, 28–32) suggests that small plants and firms
generally have a lower productivity than their larger counterparts. The exclusion of these
firms from the 1930 schedule thus results in an overestimate of eﬃciency and productivity
in comparison to the prewar numbers. In all, the proportion of the people working in British
manufacturing employed by smaller firms is estimated in the 1930 census at approximately
10 percent (Board of Trade 1933–5, V:9–11,). On the basis of this proportion, Fremdling, de
Jong, and Timmer (2007, 372–3) reckon that an upward bias of approximately 2 percent is
introduced in the British interwar productivity statistics. As noted in appendix A, prior to
the First World War, the US census exempted only those establishments with an annual pro-
duction valued at $500 or less. As the average output per person engaged in manufacturing
amounted to $2,560 in 1909, the scope of the American census is thus nearly as wide as the
1907 British census (United States Department of Commerce 1913).
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C Distance functions
In this chapter I emphasize the role of technological change as a driver behind the wave of
modernization that marked the interwar period and stress the importance of eﬃciency be-
hind the British productivity dynamics of the 1920s and 1930s, particularly in relation to
the US. Studies on technological change in the Anglo-American convergence debate have so
far primarily been based on traditional growth accounting exercises. These studies assume
that an economy is operating on its production function, and consequently, treat total-factor
productivity (TFP) analogous to technological change. Such an interpretation is prone to
serious limitations, however, as it usually requires several restrictive assumptions such as
allocative and technical eﬃciency, factor-neutral technological change and constant returns-
to-scale.37 By adopting a data envelopment analysis (DEA), which applies non-parametric
linear programming techniques, I can decompose TFP into two mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive components: [1] changes in technological eﬃciency and [2] shifts in technology over
time. In addition, as the DEA does not require the imposition of a particular functional form
on the production frontier, it allows for any type of technological change, be it biased or
factor-neutral.38
In this appendix I will summarize the basic framework behind the DEA, based primarily
on the work of Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994). They illustrate that a distance function
can be used to determine the Farrell eﬃciency indices of a production set for any number
of inputs or outputs. In appendix D I will show that, on the basis of the eﬃciency scores,
a (global) production frontier can be constructed, which in turn allows me to determine the
change in technology over time (Färe et al. 1994, 68–9). In this basic example I assume that all
inputs and output quantities are non-negative and that, for each time period t = 1; : : : ;T , the
production technology St models the transformation of N inputs, xt 2 RN+ , into M outputs,
yt 2 RM+
St =
n
(xt ; yt) : xt can produce yt
o
(2)
The input distance function Dti (x
t ; yt) at time t is defined as
Dti (x
t ; yt) = min
n
 : (xt ; yt) 2 St
o
(3)
For the constant returns-to-scale case and a technology set St, the input distance function for
37. The number of restrictive assumptions within a growth accounting framework is primarily dependent on
the choice of production function. A translog production function, for instance, is much more flexible than a
Cobb Douglas specification and does not assume rigid premises such as perfect substitution between production
factors or perfect competition. Nonetheless, the vast majority of growth accounting studies in economic history
still rely on the restrictive Cobb Douglass production function.
38. The main advantage of the DEA technique is its flexibility and adaptability. A DEA allows for multiple
inputs and outputs, does not require input- or output-prices and does not require behavioral assumptions such
as cost minimization or profit maximization.
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production (xj;t ; yj;t) can be specified as
min  subject to
;1 ;:::;k
yjt 
X
k
kykt (4)
xjt 
X
k
kxkt
k  0 8 k:
The solution to the linear program for the intensity vector  and eﬃciency index  can
be interpreted as follows. There is a (hypothetical) composite producer formed as a non-
negative linear combination of all k observations using the components of . This composite
producer consumes no more than  times observation j’s inputs, while still producing j’s
output. The composite producer thus represents a fully eﬃcient producer who is located
on the global production frontier at j’s output level, while  represents the ratio between
both the inputs of the composite producer and xt
j
respectively. Note that if (xt ; yt) 2 St, the
Farrell eﬃciency index  will take on a value between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 implies
full eﬃciency.
The observations for which the input distance function returns a  equal to 1 together de-
termine the position and shape of the production frontier. The frontier is formed by tightly
enveloping the fully eﬃcient observations, or ‘best practice’ activities, with linear segments;
as illustrated in figure 2 in the main text. The frontier is thus a subset of all feasible tech-
niques that attain the highest labor productivity for the capital intensity levels they corre-
spond to (Timmer and Los 2005, 52).
Although, so far I base my results on the assumption of constant returns-to-scale, Färe,
Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994, 32–7) show that the flexible nature of the DEA allows me to
relax this assumption. The constraint k  0 implies constant returns-to-scale. By control-
ling the intensity factor with additional constraints, i.e.
P
k 
k  1 or Pk k = 1, I can impose
non-increasing and variable returns-to-scale respectively. The imposition of these additional
constraints does come at a cost of greatly increased data requirements however. A sensi-
tivity check on the basis of variable returns-to-scale, which can be found in appendix E,
demonstrates that the constant returns assumption does not significantly alter the findings
presented throughout this chapter; I therefore feel confident using it.
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D Technological change
So far I have limited the discussion of the bias in technological progress to a graphical rep-
resentation of the change for a small sample of manufacturing industries. In this section I
will illustrate the graphical representation of the change in technology over time and subse-
quently discuss the observed bias in technological change for the remaining industries in my
sample. This will allow me to determine whether, during the interwar years, technological
progress was biased toward capital-intensive production techniques. Overall, I confirm the
existence of a substantial bias in technological change. For a select number of manufacturing
industries, however, I find evidence that suggests technological change was factor-neutral.
For the latter industries, the pull toward American-style production techniques appears to be
absent, whereas for industries that experienced strongly biased technological change British
firms were drawn toward more capital-intensive ways of production.
Figure 7 presents a graphical representation of technological change. In this figure I re-
turn to the basic constant returns-to-scale case for two inputs (K and L) and one output (Y ).
In the left pane, observed production  and two frontier-technology sets are represented in

k;y

space, where y is labor productivity (Y =L) and k is capital intensity (K=L). The obser-
vation  is interior to the boundary of technology at time 0 and 1, and is thus technically
ineﬃcient. To find the fully eﬃcient input mix for this observation – i.e. the intersect with
the frontier – I utilize the input-based distance function introduced in equation (4). The dis-
tance function seeks the greatest proportional decrease in inputs, given the target output.
In this example, the distance function yields  which, for , represents the ratio between
the minimum amount of labor required and actual labor employed while still producing at
least Y ().39 The maximum feasible productivity, at the technology level of period 0, is thus
represented by
y
0
() =
Y ()

0
L()
= y()=
0
(5)
Technological change over time for  is represented in the left panel of figure 7 by the vertical
shift of the frontier; i.e. the ratio between the maximum feasible productivity at time 1 and 0,
or alternatively, the relative eﬃciency of  in period 0 divided by ’s eﬃciency with respect
to the frontier in period 1.
technological change =
y
1
()
y
0
()
=
y()=
1
y()=
0
=

0

1
(6)
The right panel of figure 7 depicts the log change of technology between the two periods
(i.e. ln

y1()
y0()

or similarly ln(y)) for both k() and any other feasible capital-intensity level
39. Note that  represents this ratio for all inputs. The optimal capital intensity level for  is thus identical to
its actual level, as k() = K()=L() = K()=L().
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Figure 7: Frontiers and technological change
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that falls within the technology set. The diagram thus depicts the relation between capital
intensity and potential labor productivity change. As noted in section 3, the bias in techno-
logical progress can be gauged by the skewness of the diagram.
Figure 8 holds the graphs of technological change for all twenty-seven industry-groups in
my sample; table 4 provides a brief description for each industry.40 For the majority of man-
ufacturing industries technological change exhibited a strong bias toward capital-intensive
production techniques. For a select number of manufacturing industries, however, I observe
no apparent capital-intensity bias in the rate of technological change, as discussed in the
main text.
40. Note that for the SIC labels I followed the following convention. The first two digits refer to the major in-
dustry group, the third digit specifies the exact industries part of that group. A ’t’ is used to join all industries
between the digits prior to and following the marker, ’n’ joins only those digits actually listed (thus excluding
those in-between), and the ’x’ is used as a wild-card, referring to all three-digit industries that are not mentioned
elsewhere; i.e. 20 refers to the entire two-digit SIC group ‘Food and kindred products’, 227 refers to the ‘Carpets
and rugs’ industries which is part of the two-digit group 22, ‘Textiles’, whereas 22x refers to all remaining indus-
tries in this group. 357t9 concerns the industries 357, 358 and 359, while 371n25 refers solely to 371, 372 and
375.
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Figure 8: Technological change
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Figure 8: Technological change (continued)
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E Robustness checks
In this section I consider several robustness checks that address three of the more vital as-
sumptions that could lead my estimates to under- or overstate the eﬀects of technological
progress and eﬃciency change on productivity growth. First, I investigate the impact of al-
ternative returns-to-scale models. Second, I consider the eﬀects of estimating the production
frontiers at the 3-digit SIC level. Lastly, I re-run my analysis on the basis of total employment
instead of hours worked. I conclude that the constraints imposed throughout this chapter do
not appear to bias the main results.
Returns to scale
Throughout this chapter I have based my decomposition results on the assumption of con-
stant returns-to-scale (CRS). This assumption is only appropriate, however, when all indus-
tries are operating at an optimal scale, which can be frustrated by imperfect competition,
constraints on finance, etc. In this case, the eﬃciency measures based on the CRS model
are biased downwards by the occurrence of scale eﬃciencies. A variable returns-to-scale
(VRS) specification excludes these scale eﬃciencies and envelopes the production points
more tightly. Consequently, the latter yields technical eﬃciency scores greater than or equal
to those obtained from the CRS model.
As noted in appendix C, the flexibility of the DEA permits me to relax the CRS constraint
and assume VRS instead. The VRS specification does increase the requirements on the data
set, however. A graphical representation of the frontier illustrates this problem. The two-
input, one-output case would require the addition of a third dimension, as labor productivity
is now not only dependent on the level of capital intensity but on the scale of production as
well. Given the added dimension and the increased surface area of the frontier, a greater
portion of the observations will form part of the (VRS) frontier and will thus be classified
as fully eﬃcient. The problem of unobserved production – either of represented countries
in the past or of otherwise unrepresented peers – is thus confounded. What would now be
interpreted as frontier movements could in fact be assimilation of knowledge associated with
unobserved appropriate techniques. The VRS specification increases the degrees of freedom
of the model, which could present identification problems for those frontiers for which I only
have a limited number of observations. Nonetheless, if both models yield comparable results,
we may conclude that the CRS assumption is appropriate for the interwar Euro-American
productivity comparison. If, however, large discrepancies are observed in the decomposition
results, this may signal that either my restrictive returns-to-scale assumption is not valid or
that the VRS model suﬀers from insuﬃcient observations.
The decomposition results for total manufacturing, based on both the CRS and VRS
method, are provided in table 5. The table lists the aggregate results for the US and Great
Britain separately. For the American decomposition, both the sub-period 1909–1929 as well
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Table 5: Robustness checks, total manufacturing, US and GB
(a) US Manufacturing, 1909–1929
annual average growth rate, in ln%
accumu- tech. eﬃ-
total lation change ciency
CRS 3.1 0.7 2.2 0.2
VRS 3.1 0.6 2.4 0.1
3DIGIT 3.1 1.0 1.9 0.2
EMP 2.5 0.5 1.7 0.3
(b) US Manufacturing, 1909–1939
annual average growth rate, in ln%
accumu- tech. eﬃ-
total lation change ciency
CRS 3.0 0.8 2.0 0.3
VRS 3.0 0.9 2.0 0.1
3DIGIT 3.0 1.0 1.8 0.2
EMP 1.7 0.4 1.2 0.0
(c) GB Manufacturing, 1907–1930
annual average growth rate, in ln%
accumu- tech. eﬃ-
total lation change ciency
CRS 1.9 1.7 1.4 -1.2
VRS 1.9 1.9 1.6 -1.6
3DIGIT 1.9 2.5 0.9 -1.5
EMP 1.2 1.5 1.1 -1.3
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as the entire 1909–1939 period are given. Note that, while the annual log growth of labor
productivity remains unaltered by the choice of a returns-to-scale model, the components of
the Kumar and Russell decomposition can still be aﬀected.
Overall, the diﬀerences between both models, at the highest level of aggregation, ap-
pear to be limited. Typically, the VRS model reports a mild increase of the accumulation
and technology components, at the expense of eﬃciency. Yet, the general conclusions re-
main unchanged. American labor productivity is driven by rapid technological change and,
to a lesser degree, capital accumulation. American eﬃciency change, for both periods, is
small and can primarily be attributed to a gainful shift in the employment structure. For
British manufacturing, the greatest contribution to labor-productivity growth results from
capital deepening. Technological change in Britain, for the VRS model, still falls short of the
progress experienced in the US, but is substantive nonetheless. Under the VRS specification,
eﬃciency decreases considerably over time for Britain. As noted above, this may be caused
by scale (in)eﬃciencies or alternatively an insuﬃcient number of observations. In either case,
the CRS assumption does not fundamentally alter my findings, I thus feel confident using it.
Frontier selection
In my analysis I have so far estimated a frontier for 27 industry groups. In the estimation of
the frontiers I pool all the three-digit observations that belong to the same two-digit indus-
try group, thus assuming that these observations share a production function at this level
of aggregation. As an implicit check I observe whether the three-digit industries in a com-
mon group will, at any point in time, be part of, or closely approach, the frontier. Only a
small number of industries failed to pass this simple test, in which case I estimated an ad-
ditional frontier for these observations. Only the chemicals sector, whose industries proved
particularly hard to group, required more than two distinct frontiers. Table 4 in appendix D
provides an overview of the two-digit frontiers in this study.
Alternatively, I can estimate a separate frontier for each of the 105 three-digit indus-
tries in my sample. However, the increase in the number of frontiers does lower the av-
erage number of observations per frontier, which could present similar data problems as
those previously discussed in the returns-to-scale section. Table 5 lists the decomposition re-
sults for total manufacturing based on this alternative frontier selection (3DIGIT), which can
be directly compared to the basic, two-digit CRS decomposition. These two decompositions
present a similar picture. For both countries, the technology component is lower than is the
case for the standard CRSmodel, while the accumulation component is elevated. Particularly
for Great Britain, the eﬀect of capital deepening is more pronounced, accompanied by a more
substantial decrease in eﬃciency. Nonetheless, the results based on the extended selection of
frontiers are in broad agreement with the findings presented in the main text. As the impact
of the alternative frontier selection is very similar for both Britain and the US and I am par-
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ticularly interested in the diﬀerence in the development of capital deepening, eﬃciency and
technological change between both countries, I conclude that the grouping of industries into
two-digit frontiers is a valid approach for this study.
Employment
As a final robustness check I turn to the definition of employment. Throughout this chapter
I relied on total hours worked as a measure of labor input, primarily because this measure
captures the substantial drop in the average length of the working week that occurred dur-
ing the interwar years. In contrast, previous productivity studies have often relied on basic
employment measures – looking exclusively at the total number of active wage earners and
employees in an industry – which thus makes comparison between these studies and my
own analysis more diﬃcult (Broadberry 1997). To facilitate this comparison and to deter-
mine whether a decomposition based on employment numbers (EMP) provides comparable
results to my basic, hours-based decomposition (CRS), I have re-run the analysis on a per-
worker basis and presented the results in table 5.
The reduction in the average length of the working week, which was evident in both coun-
tries, clearly shows in table 5. The total labor-productivity change for EMP is distinctly lower
than my productivity measure based on hours worked (CRS), particularly when I include the
1930s in the analysis. The decomposition results reflect this reduction, but otherwise remain
unaﬀected. For the US, technological change is still the driving force behind the change in
productivity, while growth in Britain originates primarily from capital accumulation. In ad-
dition, for Great Britain I also observe a clear positive impact of technology accompanied by
a worsening of eﬃciency. Nonetheless, I feel the EMP specification severely undervalues the
impact of technological progress, particularly for the 1930s, which Field (2003) has shown to
be one of the most progressive decades of the twentieth century. I therefore prefer the hours
worked measure of employment.
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